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.I. INTRODUCTION 
Business associates in a small closely held corporation fear estrange- 
ment. Typically, associates have not anticipated such a change in relations. 
One shareholder might consider withdrawal and attempt to sell his interest 
in the enterprise, but a market may not exist. The shareholder might 
propose a buyout, but the other shareholder's interest may not be liquid. The 
shareholder might plan an ouster of another shareholder, but his ownership 
interests may be evenly divided. 
* Associate Professor, Pace University School of Law; B.S., Towson State College, 1976; 
J.D., Georgetown University College of Law, 1980. 
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In In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co.,' one faction in a dispute chose the 
final solution-liquidation in bankrup t~y .~  The bankruptcy solution was 
particularly remarkable because the corporation was not in~olvent.~ Despite 
the apparent economic health of the corporation and the objection of share- 
holders owning half the company's stock, the bankruptcy court let the 
liquidation p ro~eed .~  
Apart from the seemingly radical nature of the solution to the intra- 
corporate dispute, the case is important because i t  presents a significant 
question in corporate law: may a board of directors, without shareholder 
assent, liquidate a solvent close corporation in bankruptcy? State corporation 
s tahtes  contain express provisions for terminating the corporate existence 
through dissolution, sale of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets, 
or merger.= With a minor exception in the case of merger: these acts must be 
approved by the shareholders.' Remarkably, state corporation statutes are 
silent regarding voluntary bankruptcy of a solvent business as  a form of 
corporate death.8 This silence cannobbe explained on grounds of federal pre- 
emption because the question of whether a party filing a petition in 
bankruptcy has authority to act is determined by reference to state law.9 An 
ideal of our judicial system is that "judges should apply to their cases existing 
law and not make new law . . . even when the text of particular constitutional 
provisions, statutes, or available precedents appears to offer no determinate 
guide."lO Unfortunately, as the English jurist H.L.A. Hart has noted, "what 
- 
1. In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. 775 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990). 
2. Id. at  777. The board filed a Chapter 7 petition under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,92 Stat. 2604 (current version at  11 U.S.C. $8 701-66 (1989)). 
3. In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. a t  780. 
4.  Id. 
5. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE $9 30-1-1 to -83 (Supp. 1992). 
6. See infk  text accompanying note 63. 
7. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE $30-1-79 (Supp. 1992). 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 73-99. 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 59-73. 
10. H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the 
Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969,978 (1977). Hart described the two predominant views in the 
debate over the proper role of judges in aaudicating cases as the "Dream" and the "Nightmare." 
Id. a t  973. The "Nightmare" is that "[despite] pretensions to the contrary, judges make the law 
which they apply to litigants and are not impartial, objective declarers of existing law." Id.  
Hart comments on views by scholars of the American Legal Realist Movement. He quotes 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes as saying that "'[tlhe prophecies of what the courts will do in fact 
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law,'" id .  at  974 (quoting OLIVER W. 
HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 173 (1920)), and Karl 
Llewellyn as saying that " [wlhat budges1 do about disputes is . . . the law itself,'" id., (quoting 
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 3 (1930)), and he cites Jerome Franks for the 
proposition that "the belief that there could be legal rules binding on judges and applied by them, 
not made by them, in concrete cases is stigmatized as  an immature form of fetishism or father 
fixation calling for psychoanalytical therapy." Id .  (citing JEROME FRANKS, LAW AND THE 
MODERN MIND 175,178,193,203,244,264 (1930)). Hart then summarized the central themes 
of the legal jurisprudential movements that account for the two images. Id. at  974-76. Legal 
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the existing law is need not be and very often is not obvious, and the trained 
expertise of the lawyer may be needed to extract it from the appropriate 
sources."ll But what are the relevant and permissible sources from which the 
court must extract the law? 
In Quarter Moon, the court considered the state corporation statute and 
the bankruptcy code, as  well as the company's articles of incorporation and 
bylaws.12 The court found no answer to the question of whether shareholder 
approval of the Chapter 7 petition was required.13 It  also considered the 
Supreme Court's 1933 decision in Royal Indemnity Co. v. American Bond & 
realism denounced a "purely backward-looking style of adjudication according to which 
particular decision in particular cases owed their legal justification exclusively to their relation 
to the predetermined meaning of existing legal rules" and "urged upon judges a forward-looking 
form of adjudication according to which legal rules are treated as  displaceable presumptions or 
working hypotheses, to be modified or rejected if the predictable consequences of their 
application in a shifting social context proved unsatisfactory." Id. a t  976. Hart pondered the 
affect of the Realism Movement: 
Seen from afar it appears . . . not to have advanced legal theory far or to have added 
much to the,stock of valuable jurisprudential ideas. But the virtues and beneficent 
influence of the realist movement lay elsewhere. [Ilts main effect was to convince 
many judges and lawyers, practical and academic, of two things: first, that they should 
always suspect, although not always in the end reject, any claim that existing legal 
rules or precedents were constraints strong and complete enough to determine what a 
court's decision should be without other extra-legal considerations; secondly, that 
judges should not seek to bootleg silently into law their own conceptions of the law's 
aims or justice or social policy or other extra-legal elements required for decision, but 
should openly identify and discuss them. 
Id. a t  977-78. 
According to Hart, Llewellyn rejected the assumption that 
a particular legal rule proves indeterminate in a given case so that the court is unable 
to justify its decision as the strict deductive conclusion of a syllogism in which it 
appears as  a major premise, then the decision which the court gives can only be the 
judge's legally uncontrolled choice. 
Id. a t  979,981. Instead, judges remain constrained by role, process, and method. See generally 
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE IAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA (1989). Hart states that Pound speaks 
of constraints found in "received values or ideals of the system." Hart, supm, at  981. Hart also 
considered the writings of Ronald Dworkin, who according to Hart maintains that a judge is 
never free "to determine what the law shall be; he is confined to saying what he believes is the 
law before his decision, though of course he may be mistaken." Hart, supm, a t  983; see also 
Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cmes, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975). reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1977). 
Professor Dworkin recognizes that a t  any level of enquiry into the system and the 
general principles which may be said to be immanent in the existing law there may be 
unresolved questions of this sort. To deal with them the judge must, ideally at  any 
rate, open up much wider ranging questions of justice and political morality. 
Hart, supm, at  984; see also D WORKIN, supm, at 107. 
11. Hart, supm note 10, at  972. 
12. In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. 775,778-82 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990). 
13. Id. a t  782. 
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Mortgage Co.14 In Royal Indemnity, the Court rejected a challenge to a 
bankruptcy petition on the ground it  lacked shareholder approval.16 The 
bankruptcy court relied heavily on Royal Indemnity to deny the motion in 
Quarter Moon.16 As this Article will demonstrate, the bankruptcy court 
inappropriately relied on the Supreme Court case, which could not serve as 
legal precedent for its subsequent holding in Quarter Moon. 
Although the court found no determinate answer to the question of the 
appropriateness of liquidating a solvent business through bankruptcy, it was 
not free to "push aside the law books and proceed to legislate."17 Nor would i t  
have been sound for the court simply to limit its consideration to points found 
in the language of existing rules and traditional doctrine, denying relief when 
these sources are silent. Rather, a resolution of the question requires an  
appreciation of the nature and ideology of the close corporation and a 
specially tailored doctrine. Investinent expectations that extend beyond the 
receipt of dividends, but contemplate control and economic benefits deriving 
from employment in the enterprise, distinguish this entity from the public 
corporation, for which the traditional doctrine is appropriate. 
This Article will argue that, in the absence of contrary provisions in the 
articles of incorporation, the power of the board of directors of a solvent close 
corporation to file a voluntary petition for liquidation in bankruptcy must be 
determined by the theory of "reasonable expectations." This doctrine not only 
addresses wrongdoing by those in control, but also defines the power and 
rights of close corporation participants. Part I1 briefly considers the uses of 
bankruptcy in recent years and comments on the peculiar occasion of a sol- 
vent corporation deciding to liquidate in bankruptcy. Part I11 summarizes 
the facts and identifies the two grounds on which the bankruptcy petition in 
Quarter Moon should have been dismissed. Parts IV and V explain how the 
case should have been resolved under the corporation and bankruptcy doc- 
trines. Finally, Part VI concludes with suggestions. 
14. Id. at 780-81 (citing Royal Indem. Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 165 
(1933)). The Royal Indemnity case concerned a group of creditors who sought standing to 
petition the court to vacate a judgment based on a petition authorized by the directors of a 
bankrupt corporation. Royal Indem. Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. at 166. 
State law specifically forbade transfer of the company's assets without shareholder approval 
unless done in the usual course of business. Id. 
15. Royal Indem. Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. at 170-71; 
16. In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co.. 116 B.R. at 780-81. 
17. Hart, supm note 10, at 981. 
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11. THE BANKRUPTCY SOLUTION AND THE SOLVENT 
LIQUIDATING DEBTOR 
In recent years, large corporations have filed petitions in bankruptcy 
almost as a matter of course.18 The circumstances and motivations for this 
historically ignominious course are quite varied:"J as  an act of desperation 
when facing financial disaster, as  in the cases of Federated and Allied 
Stores;20 as a tactical maneuver to foil a labor union, as in the cases of 
Continental Airlines, Eastern Airlines, and Greyhound Bus Lines;21 a s  an  
attempt to defeat tort victims, as was done by Texaco because of the Pennzoil 
l i t i ga t i~n ;~~  and perhaps out of a desire to curtail losses to  constituent^.^^ In 
each of these cases, the board of directors was responsible for unilaterally 
imposing this course on the co~porat ion.~~ Shareholders found their already 
marginalized role in  the corporate decision-making process wholly 
preempted. 
Significantly, each of these debtors is a large publicly held corporation 
with widely dispersed stock ownership. Among the shareholders of such cor- 
porations, there is a prevailing attitude of rational apathy. Any involvement 
in corporate affairs beyond the simple execution of a proxy in favor of 
management for the annual meeting is not an economical or efficient expen- 
diture of time and resources for most shareholders. These corporations were 
also insolvent or experiencing cash management problems, and in most cases, 
the corporations sought to reorganize rather than to liquidate.25 
18. See Louis Uchitelle, Business Scene: How Bankruptcy Can Feed Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 1990, at 02. The  pace of  these filings is unprecedented. Id. Between August and 
December 1990, more than 1300 companies filed for bankruptcy weekly according to the Dun & 
Bradstreet Corporation,. which tracks such data nationwide. Id. The 55,000 companies that 
declared bankruptcy from January through November 1990 listed $64.1 billion in  debts, a sum 
equal to 1.1 % of  the gross national product. Id. "Not since the Depression has the level even 
approached [one] percent." Id. 
19. See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg. The Implied Good Faith Filing 
Requirement: Sentinel of an  Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U.L. REV. 919,920 (1991); see 
generally Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54U.  CHI. L. REV. 775,776 (1987). 
20. See Isadore Barash, Campeau Invokes Bankruptcy Code for its Big Stores, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 16,1990, at A1. 
21. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supm note 19, at 933-37. 
22. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supm note 19, at 938-39. 
23. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supm note 19, at 938-39. 
24. See Barash, supra note 20, at Al; Thomas C. Hayes, Bankruptcy, Like the Strike, May 
Be Rough at Greyhound, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1990, at Dl; Thomas C. Hayes, Bankruptcy Filing 
by Greyhound, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1990, at Dl;  Steve Coll, Texcrco, Inc.. Fiks for Bankruptcy; 
Oil Giant Seeks Protection After Penzoil Talks Fail, WASH. POST, April 13, 1987, at Al. 
25. A Chapter 11 reorganization petition is an alternative to liquidation bankruptcy. See 
11 U.S.C. 8 109 (1988). The Supreme Court has observed that "[tlhe fundamental purpose of  
reorganization is  to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss o f  jobs 
and possible misuse o f  economic resources." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco. 465 U.S. 513, 528 
(1984). "By permitting reorganization, Congress anticipated that the business would continue to 
provide jobs, to satisfy creditors' claims, and to produce a return for its owners . . . . Congress 
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In Quarter Moon, the company was solvent when i t  filed for 
bankruptcy; there was no question the corporation could pay its debts as they 
came d ~ e . ~ s  Perhaps the peculiar occasion of a solvent debtor deciding to 
liquidate in bankruptcy was not contemplated by the corporation statutes, 
because the term "bankruptn (a term found in earlier, but not the current 
version of the suggests one be "depletedn or "unable to pay his credi- 
tors in full.% This level of financial distress is not, however, a prerequisite 
for filing a petition under Chapter 7.29 As the court in Quarter Moon noted, "a 
Chapter 7 'debtor' need not be insolvent to be eligible for Chapter 7 relief. 
Nor does the standard established for those persons who 'may be' debtors 
under Chapter 7 contain any specific or implied requirement that such 
persons be heavily burdened by debts."30 Collier explains further: 
Under this subdivision any person not within the excluded class who 
owes debts in any amount, no matter how small, may file a petition for 
liquidation. I t  is interesting to note that various legislative attempts to 
establish a minimum amount of debts owed as  a criterion for eligibility 
for relief have never succeeded, as such minimum requirements have 
been seen a s  being an unnecessary hardship which should not be 
inflicted upon small but certainly hard-pressed debtors. A debtor under 
[Clhapter 7 may be solvent or insolvent, and his or her motive is gener- 
ally considered to be immaterial, except that the debtor may not file a 
petition for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud. Thus, there is no reason 
why, if a solvent person cares to have its property distributed among its 
creditors through bankruptcy liquidation, it should not be allowed to do 
so . . . . [Tlhe Code structure in no way requires a debtor to allege insol- 
vency in its petition, nor to prove it, to procure relief. . . .31 
presumed that  the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated business 
than if 'sold for scrap!" United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983); see also 
H.R. REP. No. 595,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977). 
26. In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co.. 116 B.R. 775,781 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990). The court 
noted, however, t h a t  the "evidence suggests a real dificulty in accomplishing payment given the 
dispute among management." Id. 
27. The use of the term "debtor" "is a change in terminology from [the previous act], which 
identifie[d] the person by or against whom a petition is filed in a straight bankruptcy liquidation 
case a s  a 'bankrupt' . . . ." S.R. 95-989,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2549,5809. 
28. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 147 (6th ed. 1990); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 
172 (3d ed. 1987). 
29. The " insolven4 requirement appears under other sections of the Code, but  not under 
the section applicable to debtors like Quarter Moon. The legislative history makes clear that "[$ 
7071 does not contemplate . . . that the ability of the debtor to repay his debts in whole or in part 
constitutes adequate cause for dismissal." See H.R. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 380 
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,6336. 
30. In re Quarter  Moon Livestock, 116 B.R. a t  781, n.4 (quoting 2 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY 109.02, 109-12 (15th ed. 1988)). 
31. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 109.02 (citations omitted). 
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Although personal or corporate insolvency is not a prerequisite to filing a 
voluntary petition in b a n k r ~ p t c y , ~ ~  the question of solvency is "extremely 
important in ascertaining whether the benefits of the Bankruptcy Act are 
being used in bad faith or fraudulently . . . [because] no one would contend 
that the bankruptcy court exists for any purpose other than to aid financially 
emhamassed debtors in adjusting their affairs with their  creditor^."^^ 
111. QUARTER MOON LNESTOCK CO. : FACTS AND 
GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL 
Two families, the Gilberts and the Addlemans, formed Quarter Moon 
Livestock C ~ m p a n y . ~ ~  Each family was to have equal ownership and 
management interests in the corporation.36 Although the parties' children 
owned the stock, the parents acted as custodians.w The children of each 
family held eight shares of the sixteen total shares.3' The parents served as 
the outstanding directors of the corporation.38 The corporation leased pasture 
from the Gilberts, who were also paid wages to operate the business.39 The 
Addlemans supplied the accounting and bookkeeping services.40 
32. See Coastal Cable T.V. v. Coastal Cable T.V., 709 F.2d 762, 764 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating 
that "a person in bankruptcy, while not necessarily insolvent. . . must a t  least owe debts (even 
though the statute is mysteriously silent on the question)"); Porteriield v. Gerstel, 222 F.2d 137, 
140 (5th Cir. 1955) (holding that a corporation was insolvent in the equity sense. i.e.. unable to 
meet its obligations as  they matured, but not in the bankruptcy sense, because its assets 
exceeded its liabilities by approximately $80,000); In re Donaldson Ford, Inc., 19 B.R. 425, 431 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (stating that voluntary petitioner may be solvent or insolvent); In re 
Yarborough, 18 F. Supp. 359, 360 (M.D. Ga. 1937) (stating that "[a] solvent person who owes 
debts may file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy"); In re Fox West Coast Theatres, 25 F. Supp. 
250,261-62 (S.D. Cal. 1936), crfPd sub nom. Talley v. Fox Film Corp., 88 F.2d 212 (9th Cir.), and 
cert. denied, 301 U.S. 710 (1937) (stating that when a corporation seeks voluntary bankruptcy, 
only stockholders or those with a financial interest may contest an adjudication on the ground of 
absence of volition); In re People's Warehouse Co., 273 F. 611,612 (S.D. Miss. 1921) (holding that 
court had jurisdiction to act where attorney for corporation voluntarily filed for bankruptcy and 
action was ratified by majority of stockholders). 
33. Porterfield v. Gerstel, 222 F.2d a t  142. The origins of a bankruptcy proceeding can be 
traced back to the days of Roman law: "[Ilts name is derived from statutes of Italian city-states, 
where i t  was called b a c a  rupta after a medieval custom of breaking the bench of a banker or 
tradesman who absconded with property of his creditors." THOMAS H. JACKSON, 'IRE LOGIC 
AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY IAW 1 (1986) (citing Israel Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A 
Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy Luw, 52 HARV. L. REV. 189 (1938)). 
34. In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. 775,777 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990). 
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Until John Gilbert's death in August 1989, the company prospered.41 
During the following eight months, however, the parties' relationship was 
damaged beyond repair." The parties unsuccessfully negotiated for a buy-out 
of the Addlemans' However, communications broke down, the parties 
argued heatedly, and the company could no longer be managed.qJ 
The vacancy on the board of directors caused by John Gilbert's death 
was filled by the Addlemans' election of their attorney, Mr. A n d e r ~ o n . ~ ~  Mrs. 
Gilbert was not present a t  the special meeting held on March 31, 1990.46 The 
Gilberts filed suit on April 20, 1990 in Idaho state court for "judicial 
dissolution of the corporation and appointment of a receiver."47 
A shareholders' meeting held April 21 adjourned without action because 
there was no quorum." The Addleman/Anderson board then ordered the 
company's dissolution by bankr~ptcy.~s On April 25, the corporation filed its 
Chapter 7 petition.60 The Gilberts moved to dismiss the bankruptcy petition 
on two grounds.61 First, they argued the petition was not the "voluntary act" 
of the entity because the decision was not the product of a properly called 
meeting of the duly elected directors, a t  which a quorum'was present.52 They 
unsuccessfully attempted to show that under Idaho law, the board was 




43. Id. The Gilberts argued that Lance, John Gilbert's son, was elected in a negotiation 
meeting in December, 1989, to the board pursuant to an agreement under which the Gilberts 
would also buy the Addlemans' shares. Id. at 779. Later that month, Mr. Addleman "sent an 
annual corporate registration form to the Idaho Secretary of State's office showing Lance Gilbert 
as the fourth director" (although the registration form was rejected by the Secretary of State 
based on the corporation's prior failure to file annual reports or pay fees). Id. In any event, Mrs. 
Gilbert later repudiated the terms of the stock purchase arrangement, "contending that i t  had 
been 'tentative' and that she felt i t  was unfair to her family." Id. Wr. Addleman testified that 
Lance had been listed on the corporate form as  a director solely in consideration of the 
anticipated stock purchase [but] that when no agreement was consummated, he considered 
Lance's election to be ineffective." Id. 







51. Id. The Gilberts sought dismissal under 11 U.S.C. $ 707(a), which authorizes a 
bankruptcy court to dismiss a case "only after notice and a hearing and only for cause." Id. 
(citing 11 U.S.C. $ 707(a) (1988)). 
52. In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. a t  777-81. 
53. Id. a t  778. The Gilberts also contended that under the corporation's bylaws, "the 
directors were elected to hold illegal staggered terms." Id. The bylaws, "adopted in 1984, 
provided for staggered terms for each of the initial four directors, with annual elections, so that 
a t  least one-fourth of the directorship [would] stand for election at  each annual meeting." Id. 
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Alternatively, the Gilberts argued the petition constituted a "sale or 
disposition of all or substantially all of the company's assets other than in the 
ordinary course of its bus ine~s . "~~  Under Idaho law, such a final act must 
have been authorized by the  shareholder^.^^ Although there was no dispute 
about the interpretation of the asserted statute, the Gilberts could cite no 
cases from Idaho courts supporting the argument that liquidation in 
bankruptcy is tantamount to a sale of all or substantially all of the corpo- 
ration's assets, and thus should be governed by corporate rules.66 
The bankruptcy court appears to have rejected the Gilberts' arguments 
largely because of the absence of any clear Idaho law. If the analysis is 
extended, however, beyond the fixed texts of the corporate statutes to 
questions about the ideology of the close corporation and the purposes of the 
bankruptcy process, the absence of an express provision on the issue is no 
more significant than the absence of a provision on the authority of the board 
to adopt defensive measures to a hostile takeover. 
The relevant laws and policies require that a Chapter 7 petition filed 
under the circumstances in Quarter Moon be dismissed for two reasons. 
First, a Chapter 7 petition by a solvent close corporation that lacks the assent 
of the shareholders is not a "voluntary act" as required under the Bankruptcy 
Code because i t  is not an 'actn of the corporation. Second, a Chapter 7 
petition whose object is to avoid substantive state law restrictions lacks the 
good faith required of all petitioners in bankruptcy. 
N. "VOLUNTARY ACT" UNDER CORPORATION DOCTRINE 
Under section 301 of the Bankruptcy Code, a Chapter 7 petition must 
be a "voluntary act."57 Courts have interpreted this language to mean the 
The Idaho statute "limiffed] classification of directors . . . to those corporations where there are 
nine or more directors, and only then if authorized by the articles of incorporation, not the 
bylaws of the company. Id. The Gilberts pointed out that '[nlo annual meetings [had] been held 
by Quarter Moon since 1986." but the initial directors continued to serve until 1989. Id. 
Although the court recognized Quarter Moon's documents failed to meet the statutory 
requirements, such noncompliance, '[did] not compel a holding that all actions taken by the 
board were void, or even voidable, including the election of Mr. Anderson and the decision to seek 
bankruptcy liquidation under these facts." Id. The court held the directors elected under 
Quarter Moon's bylaws "were at  least de fmto in status." Id. The court stated that since Mrs. 
Gilbert was one of those illegal directors, 'equitable considerations . . . suggest she should not 
now be heard to complain." Id. 
There were other instances of disregard of corporate formalities, such as  the failure to hold 
annual meetings for several years. Id. The court suggested that 'the most appropriate remedy 
would be an order compelling the corporation to bring its documents into compliance." Id. But 
"[als against third parties, such as corporate creditors (or their trustees), the corporation's 
actions should not be upset." Id. 
54. Id. a t  779-80, 
55. Id. at  780 (citing IDAHO CODE 8 30-1-79 (1980)). 
56. Id. 
57. 11 U.S.C. 8 301 (1988). 
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petition must be filed by someone in the corporate enterprise with authority 
to act, as determined under state law.58 
A. Termination of the Corporate Existence 
Under traditional corporation doctrine, the board of directors has the 
authority to act on behalf of and manage the corpora t i~n .~~ In the exercise of 
its corporate powers, the board of directors decides how the corporation's 
assets should be applied.60 This power is limited, however, to matters 
occurring in the ordinary course of business.61 As an  extraordinary act, 
voluntary dissolution of the corporation can be accomplished only with share- 
holder approval.62 Other acts or dispositions that result in fundamental or 
organic changes to the corporation or to shareholder rights, such as a merger 
or the sale of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets, also require 
shareholder a ~ s e n t . ~  Whether there has been a sale of all or substantially all 
58. See Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100, 106 (1945); In re Giggles Restaurant, 103 B.R. 549. 
553 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1989); In re The Hawaii Times, Ltd., 53 B.R. 560,561 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985); 
In re Greater Atlanta Apartment Hunter's Guide, 40 B.R. 29, 32 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984); In re 
Crescent Beach Inn, 22 B.R. 155,157-58 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982) (upholding unanimous decision by 
two-member board to file Chapter 11 petition); In re Autumn Press, 20 B.R. 60,62 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1982) (dismissing Chapter 11 petition when signed by the sole director and the state 
statute required all corporations to have a minimum of three directors); In re American Int'l 
Indus., 10 B.R. 695, 696 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); Prosser v. Betty Brooks, Inc., No. 7938,1985 
WL 11577. a t  *2 (Del. Ch. 1985). 
In Prosser, the plaintirs motion for a preliminary injunction to restrain the consideration of 
the possible filing of a bankruptcy petition was denied, because if the filing were carried out in a 
manner in contravention of a shareholder's agreement, plaintiff had a remedy a t  law, i.e.. a 
motion directed to the bankruptcy court to dismiss the petition. Prosser v. Betty Brooks, Inc.. 
1985 WL at  *2. This was so because a bankruptcy court must determine "whether a voluntary 
petition for bankruptcy has been properly filed on behalf of the corporation by those empowered 
to take such action." Id. The bankruptcy court 
undoubtedly could grant a request by plaintiff to dismiss the bankruptcy petition if i t  
found that the action had not been properly authorized on behalf of the corporation 
because the directors failed to abstain from consideration of the matter if they were 
required to do so by the [shareholders1 [algreement. 
Id. 
59. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,8 141(a) (1991). 
60. See, e.g.. id. 
61. See, e.g., id. ("the business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board of directors"); see also MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT 8 8.01(b) 
(1992) ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business 
and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors."). 
62. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 8 275 (1991); see also MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT 
ANN. 8 14.02 (1992). 
63. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 8 251 (1991); see also MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT 
ANN. $8 11.01, 12.02 (1992). 
Under the short form merger doctrine, a corporation owning at  least 90% of the outstanding 
shares of each class of another corporation may merge such other corporation into itself without 
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of the assets is not always obvious and must be determined by considering 
the relevant facts and circumstances of each case. The nature of the trans- 
action and whether it furthers the express objectives of the corporation's 
existence is also re1evant.a If the sale is the type of transaction for which the 
corporation was o rgan i~ed ,~~  and the "effect does not work a practical 
dissolution of the corporate busines~,"~ the transaction may be found to be in 
the regular course of business, thus eliminating the requirement of share- 
holder assent. These factors should not end the inquiry, however, because 
the quantity of the assets sold should also be considered. If the assets are 
quantitatively vital to the operation of the corporation and substantially 
affect the existence and purpose of the corporation, the transaction may be 
considered e~traordinary.~' The sale or transfer of major assets causing a 
the approval of the shareholders of either corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN.  tit. 8, Q 253 (1991); 
N.Y. BUSINESS COW. LAW 5 905 (McKinney 1986). 
Statutory provisions governing the sale of assets by a corporation have been enacted in 
every jurisdiction. See generally 6A WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS Q 2949.2 (1989). The majority of these statutes make a 
distinction between when all, or substantially all, of the corporate assets are sold in the regular 
course of business and otherwise. Id. Shareholder assent is not required in the first instance, 
but is in the second. Id. According to Fletcher, some states make no distinction between the two 
types of transactions, in which case shareholder assent is required for all transfers of all, or 
substantially all of the corporate assets. Id. (listing Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts, 
Nevada, and Oklahoma). In other states, the statutes list the circumstances in which 
shareholder approval is not required. Id. (1989 & Supp. 1992) (listing Louisiana). 
64. Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d 1274, 1275 (Del. Ch. 1981) (holding sale of subsidiary 
representing 51% of corporation's pretax income in one year and when the corporation proposed 
to embark on a new line of manufacture, was a radical departure from corporation's historically 
successful line of business); Philadelphia Natl  Bank v. B.S.F. Co., 199 A2d 557,561 (Del. Ch.), 
rev'd on other groundc, 204 A.2d 746 (Del. Ch. 1969); In re Miglietta, 39 N.E.2d 224,228 (N.Y. 
1942); In re Timmis, 93 N.E. 522,523 (N.Y. 1910). 
65. Keck Enter. v. Braunschweiger, 108 F. Supp. 925, 928 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (holding that 
when corporation was organized to manufacture and sell certain games, sale of most of the 
corporation's product was in furtherance of the corporation's regular course of business); Brown 
v. Eastern States Corp., 86 F. Supp. 887, 891 (D. Md.), a f f d ,  181 F.2d 26 (4th Cir. 1949). cert. 
denied, 340 U.S. 864 (1950); Morris v. Washington Medical Ctr., 331 A.2d 132, 137 (D.C. 1975); 
Fettig v. Heinz Mfg., 270 N.E.2d 335,336 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971); In re Miglietta, 39 N.E.2d at 226. 
66. In re United Gas Corp., 58 F. Supp. 501,513 (D. Del. 1944), u f d ,  162 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 
1947); see also Dukas v. Davis Aircraft Prods. Co., 516 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
In Dukas, the corporation was 'engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing and selling 
restraints used in aircraft." Dukas v. Davis Aircraft Prods. Co.. 516 N.Y.S.2d a t  782. The board 
contracted to exchange a building used for its operations for another. Id. The court held that 
because the corporation continued in the same business and operations, the transaction did not 
result in a liquidation of the business and shareholder approval was unnecessary. Id. 
67. See Vig v. Deka Realty Corp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 633,634 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). In Vig, the 
corporation was incorporated to "'do everything suitable, proper and conducive to the successful 
conduct of a real estate business,' including the buying and selling of real property." Id. a t  634. 
The corporation was largely dormant during its first two years. Id. Thereafter, it acquired the 
property a t  issue, which became the only significant asset of the corporation. Id. The 
corporation operated and managed the building located on the property for two years, but had no 
other business. Id. A shareholder challenged the sale on the ground it  lacked shareholder 
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change in the nature of the corporate business or purpose is unusual and 
irregular.68 
There appears to be an exception to these general rules when the corpo- 
ration is insolvent or in failing condition. A number of courts have held the 
board of directors alone may dispose of the entire assets to pay debts and 
avoid the execution of judgments by sale and their attendant losses.69 The 
logic of this rule is that the shareholders' power to determine the course of 
the corporation is compromised because a third party, such as a creditor, can 
force a liquidation.'O 
assent. Id. The court found the corporation's regular business was managing this one piece of 
property. Id. Thus, the sale constituted a sale of the corporation's sole asset and was not made 
in the usual course of business. Id. Consequently, shareholder assent was required. Id. 
On the other hand, in Gimbel v. Signal Cos., the court held the corporation's sale of all of its 
stock in a wholly-owned subsidiary was a transaction in the ordinary course of business. Gimbel 
v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 607-08 (Del. Ch.), affd on other grounds, 316 k 2 d  619 (Del. 1974). 
The sale represented about 26% of the total assets of the corporation, 41% of the corporation's 
net worth, and 15% of the corporation's revenues and earnings. Id.  a t  607. The court held that 
"from a straight quantitative approach . . . the sale . . . does not constitute a sale of 'all or 
substantially all' of Signal's assets." Id. The court further held that the nature of the 
corporation's business contemplated the acquisition and disposal of independent branches of its 
corporate business. Id. a t  607-08; see also Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933,951 (N.D. 
Ill. 1982) (holding sale of an asset representing a t  least 26% and possibly as  much as 50% of a 
corporation's total assets is not a sale of substantially all of the assets). 
68. See Campbell v. Vose, 515 F.2d 256, 259-60 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding transfer of all 
operating assets of a corporation to a wholly owned subsidiary required stockholder approval); 
Katz v. Bregman, 431 k 2 d  1274, 1275-76 (Del. Ch. 1981) (holding proposed sale of substantially 
all assets of corporations required stockholder approval); Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 k 2 d  at  606- 
08 (holding transactions in ordinary course of business do not require shareholder approval); 
Schwadel v. Uchitel, 455 So. 2d 401,403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding restaurant was sole 
asset of the corporation organized to engage in the restaurant business, therefore sale amounted 
to substantially all of the corporation's assets); Stiles v. Aluminum h d s .  Co., 86 N.E.2d 887, 
888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1949) (holding manufacturing corporation's sale of all plants, tools, machinery, 
office equipment and furniture, trucks, inventory, goodwill and patents, but retention of the 
corporation's stock in a subsidiary, money in a bank, accounts receivable and securities, and an 
automobile was sale of "substantially all of the assets," other than in the regular course of 
business, which required shareholder assent); see also Prince George's Country Club, Inc. v. 
Edward R. Carr, Inc., 202 A.2d 354,351-60 (Md. 1964); In re Timmis, 93 N.E. 522 (N.Y. 1942). 
But see Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int l  v. Eastern Airlines, 701 F. Supp. 865, 878-79 (D.D.C. 1988), 
affd without opinion, 889 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 19891, cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 37 (1991) (holding 
sale of shuttle operations representing only 2:9% of the corporation's total assets a t  net book 
value, 1.5% of its total operations and 4.3% of its total operating revenue was not a sale of 
substantially all assets). 
69. See FLETCHER, supm note 63, 5 2949.5; see also Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining 
Co., 254 U.S. 590, 596-97 (1921); McDaniel v. Frisco Employees' Hosp. Ass'n, 510 S.W.2d 752, 
753-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Rocket Mining Corp. v. Gill, 483 P.2d 897,900-01 (Utah 1971). 
Some state statutes authorize this act when the corporation is in a failing condition. See, 
e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 8 12:121 (West 1969 & Supp. 1992). But see Michigan Wolverine 
Student Coop. v. Goodyear & Co., 22 N.W.2d 884,888 (Mich. 1946). 
70. Under the Bankruptcy Code, creditors can force a debtor into bankruptcy. The Code 
provides in pertinent part: 
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In a Chapter 7 proceeding the debtor's assets are determined, liqui- 
dated, and distributed to claimants and shareholders in order of priority.71 
,The Quarter Moon court did not find that the similar consequences of the two 
kinds of liquidation controlled its interpretation of the state law.72 The 
absence of a provision in the state statute requiring shareholder authoriza- 
tion for bankruptcy meant there was a difference between a sale of all assets 
under corporation doctrine and a liquidation in bankruptcy; thus, a decision 
to liquidate through a bankruptcy petition need not be approved by the 
 shareholder^.^^ The silence of state statutes, however, cannot be interpreted 
as a positive rule that the decision to pursue liquidation in bankruptcy is no 
different in kind and consequence than the decision to pursue, for example, 
business in corn farming in addition to cattle ranching.74 Nevertheless, under 
the general principle that management of the corporation rests with the 
board of directors, shareholder assent would not be required.76 Moreover, it is 
difficult to conceive of a Chapter 7 liquidation of assets representing 100% of 
a corporation's assets and 100% of its operations as anything but "a sale of all 
or substantially all of its assets," other than in the ordinary course of 
business.76 The liquidation "work[sl a practical dissolution of the corporate 
business."77 
B. A Misreading of Precedent 
In Quarter Moon, the Gilberts offered case law from other jurisdictions 
to support their argument that liquidation should be regarded as a sale of all 
or substantially all of the company's assets.78 One case cited by the court, In  
- - --- - - 
An involuntary case may be commenced only under Chapter 7 or 11 of this title, and 
only against a person, except a farmer, family farmer, or a corporation that is not a 
moneyed, business or commercial corporation, that may be a debtor under the chapter 
under which such case is commenced. 
11 U.S.C. 4 303(a) (1991). 
71. See id. $4 501-520, 701-704, 726. In most Chapter 7 cases, a trustee is appointed, who 
is then authorized to gather the debtor's nonexempt property and convert i t  to cash. Id. 94 701- 
704. The trustee then distributes the property according to a guideline provided by the Code. Id. 
4 701. Only an "individual" debtor is granted a full discharge. Id. 8 727(a)(1). Corporations and 
partnerships may not be discharged with liquidation. Id. 4 727(a). 
72. In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. 775,779-80 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990). 
73. Id. at  779-80. The bankruptcy judge found it  "curious why it  is not mentioned 
expressly in either the provisions requiring shareholder approval, . . . or the provision providing 
for 'dissenters" rights." Id. at  780 n.3. 
74. Id. a t  780-81. The Quarter Moon court noted that dissenters' rights are not triggered 
under a court order. Id. a t  780. Instead, the Bankruptcy Code provides the minority 
shareholders "with ample protection of their shareholder rights." Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at  779-80. 
77. In re United Gas Corp., 58 F. Supp. 501,513 (D. Del. 19441, affd ,  162 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 
1947); see also Dukas v. Davis Aircraft Prods. Co., 516 N.Y.S.2d 781,782 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
78. In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. 775,780 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990). 
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re Quartz Gold Mining Co. ,79 seemed on poiqt. In Quartz Gold, creditors filed 
an involuntary petition against the corp~ration.~~ By a board resolution, the 
corporation admitted its inability to pay its debts and its willingness to be 
adjudged bankrupt.81 In an action challenging the board's power to take this 
action, the court stated: 
I t  is not an ordinary power pertaining to the board to dissolve the corpo- 
ration, or to wind out its business; and the [llegislature of the state has 
declared that the stockholders may do these acts. So that, under the 
statute, the directors are without any power whatsoever in the premises. 
If they cannot authorize dissolution and a winding out of the business of 
the corporation, i t  would seem to logically follow that they could not, in 
behalf of and as the act of the corporation, commit an act of bankruptcy 
which entails an entire disposition of the assets of the concern and a full 
settlement of all its past business transactions, unless by some authority 
of the stockholders, through appropriate by-laws or specific resolutions 
empowering them so to act.82 
The Quarter Moon court rejected the case on this point without much 
explanation-it merely noted that it found other cases "which indicate that a 
bankruptcy filing may be authorized by the board alone."83 The court 
nonetheless adopted the Quartz Gold court's logic on the significance of 
corporate charter  provision^.^^ The court proceeded from the presumption 
that the board held the sole power to liquidate the corporation in bankruptcy 
unless qualified either by the statute or the corporation's charter.s5 Finding 
no specific reference in the statute and no such qualification in the corpora- 
tion's organizational documents, the court denied the shareholders' motion to 
dismiss.86 Consider, however, the last two lines of the above quoted text from 
Quartz Gold.87 The theory expressed is precisely the opposite of that adopted 
in Quarter Mo0n.~8 As stated in Quartz Gold, the power to liquidate in 
bankruptcy is held jointly by both the board and shareholders unless this 
79. In re Quartz Gold Mining Co., 157 F. 243 (D. Or. 19071, afPd sub nom. Vindicator 
Consol. Gold Mining Co. v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co.. 158 F. 1022 (8th 
Cir. 1908). 
80. Id. at 244. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 246. 
83. In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co.. 116 Bankr. at 780. 
84. See id. at 778-79. 
85. Id. at 779-80. 
86. Id. at 782. The court explained that because the sale or disposition of assets in 
bankruptcy would be effected under court order, dissenters' rights are denied because the judicial 
supervision would protect minority shareholders to the same extent as under dissenters' rights. 
Id. at 780. 
87. Seesupm text accompanying note 82. 
88. See In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. at 780-81. 
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power is denied to the shareholders in the corporation's organizational 
documents.89 
The Quarter Moon court appeared to place great significance on Royal 
Indemnity Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage C O . , ~  a 1933 Supreme Court 
We are told that this [Maine corporation] statute prohibits the filing of a 
voluntary petition in bankruptcy by authority of a resolution of the board 
of directors, and that a shareholders' vote is required to authorize such 
action. No case decided by the Maine courts is cited in support of this 
assertion. But it is said that the filing of such a petition is a conveyance 
of all of the corporate property, and so plainly within the statutory prohi- 
bition. We cannot agree. . . . [Ilt seems too plain to need elaboration that 
the statute does not in terms affect the initiation of a bankruptcy 
proceeding, and was passed for a wholly different purpose.02 
The Quarter Moon court, however, misread Royal Indemnity. Two questions 
were posed to the Supreme Court in Royal Indemnity: 
[I] Has the location where a corporation maintained its main office and 
transacted most of its business ceased to be the principal place of 
business for the purposes of jurisdiction in bankruptcy if, during the 
greater portion of six months preceding the filing of the petition, the 
company's assets and affairs were in the custody and control of equity 
receivers? [21 Have creditors standing to ask the vacation of an adjudi- 
cation based on a petition filed by the directors of the bankrupt, where a 
statute of the state of incorporation forbids transfer, except in the usual 
course of business, of the franchises or assets of the company, without 
stockholder's assent?93 
The Court answered both questions in the negative. Answering the second 
question, the Court held that "the petition in a voluntary or involuntary 
proceeding is a pleading,"g4 and that "[tlhe entry of an adjudication vests title 
in the trustee, and this transfer of title is the act of the court, not of the 
p e t i t i ~ n e r . ~ ~  Moreover, the Court found it self-evident that the statute a t  
89. See In re Quartz Gold Mining Co., 157 F. at 246. 
90. Royal Indem. Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 165 (1933). 
91. See In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. at 780. 
92. Id. (quoting Royal Indem. Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. at 170-71). 
In Qwrter Moon, the bankruptcy court also cited In re High-Low Tank Car Service Stations, 254 
F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1958), and In re Pneumatic Tube Stkam Splicer Co., 60 F.2d 524 (D.C. Md. 
1932). 
93. Royal Indem. Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. at 166. 
94. Id. at 171. 
95. Id. 
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issue was not intended to affect the initiation of a bankruptcy proceeding.96 
The Court further explained its decision: 
We might rest our decision as to the second question upon this 
ground. But there is another equally persuasive. Statutes such as the 
one relied on are intended for the protection of stockholders and have 
nothing to do with the interests or rights of creditors. Even if action of 
directors authorizing thi filing of a voluntary petition, or admitting 
inability of the corporation to pay its debts and its willingness on that 
ground to be a@udged a bankrupt, thus creating an act of bankruptcy. . . 
were in excess of the authority conferred, or otherwise invalid, creditors 
could not for that reason attack the consequent adjudication. The 
question is purely one of the internal management of the corporation?' 
The language of the decision seems too plain. The Supreme Court did 
not decide whether under state law, the board alone could authorize the filing 
of a bankruptcy petition to liquidate. I t  did nothing more than decide that 
"[clreditors have no standing to plead statutory requirements not intended for 
their p r o t e c t i ~ n . ~ ~  Other cases cited in Quarter Moon relied upon Royal 
Indemnity as controlling and reflected the same mi~ read ing .~~  In re Quartz 
squarely addressed the issue in Quarter Moon, and should have informed the 
bankruptcy court. Moreover, even if i t  is accepted that the bankruptcy court 
could properly decline to follow In re Quartz because it was from another 
jurisdiction, application of other corporation principles requires the same 
result. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).. 
98. Id. 
99. See In re Joseph Feld & Co., 38 F. Supp. 506 (D.N.J. 1941). The Feld court ruled that 
"[ilt appears to be well established in the absence of any restrictions, either under the charter or 
statute, a board of directors, without the consent of the stockholders, may authorize the filing of 
a voluntary petition in bankruptcy" and that Yhe right of directors to authorize bankruptcy is 
not inconsistent with the right of shareholders to authorize dissolution." Id. at  507. The court 
nonetheless declined jurisdiction of the voluntary petition in bankruptcy because the meeting of 
the board of directors authorizing the institution of the bankruptcy proceeding did not comport 
with local law. Id. New Jersey law required due notice to all directors of the time, place, and 
subject of a meeting, absent waiver. Id. One of the three directors of the corporation neither 
attended the meeting authorizing the petition nor was notified of it; thus, the resolution was 
invalid. Id.; see also Boyce v. Chemical Plastics, 175 F.2d 839 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 
828 (1949) (corporation was a t  all times insolvent and, under statute giving board power to 
manage the corporation, i t  had power to authorize the filing of a petition in voluntary 
bankruptcy); In re Crescent Beach Inn, 22 B.R. 155 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982) (authority to file 
bankruptcy petition depends on governing instruments of corporation and on state law). 
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C .  Board Power and Discretion Under Traditional Corporation Doctrine 
Traditional corporation doctrine developed to govern the operation and 
to foster the growth of the large, publicly held entity. Shareholders were 
passive investors and the entity was run by directors and officers whose 
power and discretion were limited primarily by the fiduciary duties of care 
and loyalty.100 Even these constraints were lessened by the business judg- 
ment rule, a doctrine requiring judicial deference to decision-making by 
corporate managers.lol When corporate actions affected minority share- 
holders in  a negative, though not improper or illegal fashion, such 
shareholders had recourse in the market because shares were freely trans- 
ferable. Under this conception of the entity, liquidation of the large publicly 
held corporation through bankruptcy, rather than under the corporation 
statutes, probably made little difference to the average shareholder, whose 
investment involved no more than the price of the stock.lo2 A public corpo- 
ration's liquidation in bankruptcy by the sole act of the board, however, raises 
a question that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
D. Board Power and Discretion Under Close Corporation Doctrine 
Liquidation of an otherwise profitable close corporation could mean 
financial ruin for the shareholder whose livelihood depends on the corpora- 
tion. No single, generally accepted definition exists for the close corporation. 
Some commentators define a close corporation as  an "integration of owner- 
ship and management," in which the stockholders occupy most management 
positions.lo3 Others focus on the number of stockholders and the nature of 
100. The duty of care requires directors and officers to act in good faith by exercising the 
degree of care as an  ordinarily prudent person in like position under similar circumstances and 
in a manner he reasonably bklieves to be in the best interests of the corporation. See MODEL 
BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. $0 8.30(a), 8.42(a) (1991). In its most rudimentary sense, this duty 
requires directors to be knowledgeable about the business, be fully informed before making a 
decision, and to investigate signs of trouble or improprieties by other actors. See Francis v. 
United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814,822 (N.J. 1981). The duty of loyalty requires honesty, candor, 
and a subordination of personal interests to those of the corporation. Guth v. LOR, Inc., 5 A.2d 
503,510 (Del. Ch. 19391, affd, 19 A2d 721 (Del. 1941). 
101. The business judgment rule is a presumption that in making decisions, the board of 
directors has acted in good faith, on an informed basis, and in the best interests of the 
corporation. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805,812 (Del. 1984). To rebut the presumption, the shareholder has the burden to show the 
decision was tainted by fraud, self-interest, illegality, or some other improper conduct. See 
Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807,812, affd, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1976). 
102. Of course, the stock's liquidating value is usually less than the going concern value. 
Accordingly, the shareholder in the public corporation suffers when she is denied the choice of 
selling her shares on the open market. 
103. F. H O N E  0% & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEALS CLOSE CORPORATIONS 1.02 
(3d ed. 1988). 
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the market; in particular, a small, private, or nonexisting market.10" Under 
the latter view, a close corporation has few stockholders and little market 
exists for corporate stock.lO6 Indeed, the participants in a close corporation 
often restrict transfer of stock to control entry into the enterprise and to avoid 
a close relationship with incompatible persons.108 The distinctive nature of a 
close corporation has been recognized since the late 1950s. Many states have 
enacted special close corporation codes or included special provisions in the 
general corporation statutes.lo7 
Beyond structural differences, a close corporation is functionally and 
philosophically different from a publicly held corporation. Close corporations 
are "companies based on personal relationshipsn that give rise to certain 
"reasonable expectationsn on the part of those acquiring an interest in the 
entity.lo8 These "reasonable expectationsn are many, and concern matters 
beyond the basic right to vote for directors and to receive dividends. 
Unlike the typical shareholder in a publicly held corporation, who may be 
simply an investor or a speculator a n d  does no t  desire to assume the 
responsibilities of management,  the shareholder i n  a close corporation 
- - - - 
104. See id.; see also Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders 
Reasombk Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193,196 (1988). 
105. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975); Crosby v. 
Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217,220 (Ohio 1989). 
106. See O'NEAL &THOMPSON, supm note 103, $7.02. 
107. Defining the close corporation has not been a simple matter. Some state statutes omit 
a definition and simply afford greater flexibility to all corporations by reducing the minimum 
number of incorporators and directors required, and by relaxing the manner of taking action; i.e., 
by permitting meetings by conference call and by written consent. Other states have enacted 
special close corporation statutes that define the entity. The Delaware General Corporation Law 
contains a subchapter pertaining exclusively to corporations whose issued shares must be held 
by not more than 30 persons, subject to one or more authorized restrictions on transfer, and not 
sold in any public offering within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8,$ 342 (1991). 
For a discussion of the various legislative approaches to the close corporation see WILLIAM 
L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 262-66 (6th ed. 1988). Cary and Eisenberg 
state: 
The major problem [with close corporation statutes] can be simply stated: Most of the 
statutes are for most purposes, applicable only to corporations that opt in, by an 
explicit election, for special statutory treatment. However, the data convincingly shows 
that only a tiny fraction of newly formed corporations elect such treatment. . . . The 
number of previously existing corporations that make such an election is undoubtedly 
even smaller. The result is that for many practical purposes, these statutes are much 
ado about nothing. Most of the modem statutes continue to leave close corporations in 
the lurch in important ways. 
Id. a t  266 (citations omitted); see also O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 103,s 9.26. 
108. F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 
33 BUS. LAW. 873, 886-87 (1978); see also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558 (N.C. 
1983). 
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considers himself or herself a s  a co-owner of the business and wants the 
privileges and powers that go with ownership.lo9 
The shareholder's principal source of income is often work in the corpora- 
tion.l1° Moreover: 
rl'he shareholder] may or may not anticipate an ultimate profit from the 
sale of his interest, but he normally draws very little from the corpora- 
tion as  dividends. In  his capacity as an  officer or employee of the 
corporation, he looks to his salary for the principal return on his capital 
investment, because earnings of a close corporation, as  is well known, are 
distributed in major part in salaries, bonuses and retirement benefits."' 
Because close corporations are often formed by family members or friends, 
participants simply do not believe disagreements could ever arise to frustrate 
these "reasonable expectations." Thus, participants often fail to document 
their agreement or an  understanding of their role in the company.l12 The 
following is a typical scenario: 
[Tlhe minority party, because of lack of awareness of the risks, or 
because of the weakness of his bargaining position, fails to negotiate for 
protection. Probably a common instance of this kind occurs where a n  
employee or an  outsider is given an opportunity to buy stock in a close 
corporation wholly or substantially owned by a single s&ckholder or a 
small group of associations, often a family. . . . [Hlis enthusiasm and 
weak bargaining position make it unlikely almost to a certainty that he 
will ask for-let alone insist upon-protection for his position a s  a 
minority stockholder.113 
When dissension developed, American courts traditionally were reluctant to 
interfere in the internal affairs of corporations.l14 ' This reluctance placed the 
minority shareholder 'in a remediless situation. The minority shareholder 
109. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supm note 103,P 1.07. 
110. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supm note 103,s 1.07; see also O'Neal, supra note 108, at 887. 
111. F. HODGE O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS 14 (1st ed. 1958). 
112. O'Neal, supm note 108, at 886. 
113. J.A.C. Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close 
Corpomtion, U. ILL. L. F. 1, 17-18 (1969). Of course, if the parties could muster pragmatism as 
well as the necessary trust when they contemplate the formation of a close corporation, the 
statutes of many states would let them include a variety of provisions in the corporate documents 
to avoid, as well as resolve, disputes. For example, under the Delaware statute, the parties can 
adopt directors' agreements and shareholders' voting agreements. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,39 
350,355 (1991). They can agree to submit certain matters to binding arbitration. and can even 
agree to dissolve upon the occurrence of a certain event or contingency. Id.; see also N.Y. BUS. 
CORP. LAW Q 1002 (McKinney 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. $9 33-18-200 to -330 (Law Co-op 1990); 
TEX BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 12,9 32(AX5) (West 1991). 
114. O'Neal, supm note 108, at 884. 
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had neither a partner's power to dissolve the business unit a t  will, nor the 
"way out" open to a shareholder in a publicly held corporation, which was the 
opportunity to sell shares in the open market."5 
The illiquidity.of a minority shareholder's interest in a close corporation 
thus rendered the shareholder vulnerable to exploitation by the majority 
shareholders.l16 The minority shareholder fell victim to the "freeze-out," in 
which the shareholder was denied employment in the company, and denied 
all other economic return on investment if a spiteful board refused to declare 
dividends or make other distributions.l17 
Until the last two decades, the duties of care and loyalty largely deter- 
mined the rights and interests of close corporation participants. This was 
true even though courts found majority shareholders owed a heightened level 
of loyalty to minority shareholders. The majority shareholders' duty was 
similar to the duty partners owe each other in a partnership. The similarity 
is due to the fundamental resemblance between the two entities. In Donahue 
v. Rodd Electrotype Co.llS the court described the duty as "utmost good faith 
and loyalty.""g This heightened duty requires that "[ilf the majority under- 
takes, either directly or indirectly, through the directors, to conduct, manage, 
or direct the corporation's affairs, they must do so in good faith, and with an 
eye single to the best interests" of the corporation.120 Thus, "majority or 
controlling shareholders breach [their] fiduciary duty to minority or non- 
controlling [sic] shareholders when control of the close corporation is utilized 
to prevent the minority" or noncontrolling shareholders "from having an 
equal opportunity in the c~rporation."'~~ In Quarter Moon, the Chapter 7 
115. (MEAL, supm note 111, at 166-67. 
116. (MEAL, supm note 111, a t  166-67. The close corporation is unique in  tha t  it poses 
the potential for abuse not only of the minority by the mqjority shareholders, but conversely. See 
Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798,802 (Mass. 1981) (veto power under certificate 
of incorporation provision requiring 80% vote for corporate action held by a minority shareholder 
had the substantial effect of reversing the usual roles of the  majority and the  minority 
shareholders, such tha t  the minority became a n  ad  hoc controlling interest). The New York 
Court of Appeals also recognized this peculiar vulnerability. See In  re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 
N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that i t  would contravene the remedial purpose of the 
statute to permit i t s  use by minority shareholders merely a s  a coercive tool and tha t  the 
"minority shareholder whose own acts, made in bad faith and undertaken with a view toward 
forcing a n  involuntary dissolution, give rise to the complained-of oppression should be given no 
quarter in the statutory protection."). 
117. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (Mass. 1975); see also 
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657,662 (Mass. 1976). 
118. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). 
119. Id. at 515; see also Alaska Plastics v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270,276 (Alaska 1980); Tillis 
v. United Parts ,  395 So. 2d 618, 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Horizon House Microwave v. 
Bazzy, 486 N.E.2d 70, 76 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); ~ r o s b y  v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 
1989). 
120. Crosby v. Beam. 548 N.E.2d a t  221. 
121. Id.; see also Alaska Plastics v. Coppock, 621 P.2d a t  27; Tillis v. United Parts, 395 So. 
2d at 619; Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d at 662; Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype 
Co., 328 N.E.B~ at 518. 
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petition was filed a t  the insistence of the Addlemans, who controlled the 
board after the death of one of the founding members.122 The filing denied the 
Gilberts an equal opportunity in decision making within the corporation. 
In recent years, the seemingly stringent requirements of the duty of 
loyalty for close corporation participants have offered i n ~ ~ c i e n t  protection. 
For example, a minority shareholder's discharge from the corporate office, 
leaving him with no economic return except dividends, might be upheld under 
the business judgment rule when there is a business purpose and no showing 
of bad faith.lZ3 A purchase of stock from majority shareholders might not 
violate the duty of loyalty if the price paid was fair, although it  might other- 
wise have been acquired a t  a lower price.lZ4 Minority shareholders, then, 
would be left without redress when "[tlhe real vice of such actions lies in the 
fact that they treat shareholders unequally, defeat legitimate expectations of 
a sort found in closely, but not publicly, held corporations or both."lZ5 
A "reasonable expectations" analysis is a judicial theory developed to 
fill this gap in corporate law. It departs from traditional corporation doctrine 
because the court's inquiry focuses on the impact of majority actions on 
minority shareholders, rather than on any particular wrongdoing by those in 
control. 126 
122. In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. 775,777 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990). 
123. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 107, a t  460. 
124. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 107, a t  460. 
125. CARY & EISENBERG, supm note 107, a t  460. See also Wilkes v. Springside Nursing 
Hone. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). In Wilkes, the majority shareholders breached their 
fiduciary duty by removing a minority shareholder from the payroll of a close corporation, which 
had never paid a dividend, where there was no legitimate business purpose for the removal. 
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d at  664. The court held that even if the board is 
able to articulate a legitimate business purpose, a minority shareholder should have the 
opportunity to show that the same end could be achieved by some less harmful means. Id. a t  
663. 
126. See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983). Under the corporation 
statute applied in Meiselman, the court was empowered to make 
such order or grant such relief, other than dissolution, . . . including. . . : 
(1) Canceling or altering any provision contained in the charter or by-laws of the 
corporation; or (2) Canceling, altering, or enjoining any resolution or other act of the 
corporation; or (3) Directing or prohibiting any act of the corporation or of shareholders, 
directors, oficers or other persons party to the action; or (4) Providing for the purchase 
at  their fair value of shares of any shareholder, either by the corporation or by other 
shareholders. 
Id. a t  564 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. Q 55-125(a) (1973) (repealed 1989)). The general business 
corporation act was revised in 1989, and specifically mentions only the last described form of 
relief. It states: "In any proceeding brought by a shareholder. . . in which the court determines 
that dissolution would be appropriate, the court shall not order dissolution if, after such 
determination, the corporation elects to purchase the shares of the complaining shareholder a t  
their fair value." N.C. GEN. STAT. Q 55-14-31 (1991). 
A few states have adopted statutes specifically incorporating reasonable expectations 
analysis to resolve shareholder disputes in a close corporation. See, for example, MINN. STAT. 
ANN. 8 302A.751(3Xa) (West Supp. 1992). which states: 
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[Under the theory,] a court should give relief, dissolution or some other 
remedy to a minority shareholder whenever corporate managers or 
controlling shareholders act in a way that disappoints the minority 
shareholder's reasonable expectations, even though the acts of the 
managers or controlling shareholders fall within the literal scope of 
powers or rights granted them by the corporation act or the corporation's 
charter or bylaws.12' 
Thus, in addition to those shareholder rights found under traditional 
corporation doctrine, such as  the right to vote, inspect records, and receive 
dividends, the rights and interests of close corporation participants include 
those derived from their reasonable expectations. These include a right to 
continued employment,128 "fringe benefits which flow from association with 
In determining whether to order equitable relief, dissolution, or a buy-out, the court 
shall take into consideration the duty which all shareholders in a closely held 
corporation owe one another to act in an honest, fair, and reasonable manner in 
operation of the corporation and the reasonable expectations of the shareholders as 
they exist a t  the inception and develop during the course of the shareholders' 
relationship with the corporation and with each other. 
Id.; see also CAL CORP. CODE 9 1804 (West 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE 9 10-19.1-115 (1985); 
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, MODEL mAT. CLOSE CORP. SJPP. 5 41(a) (1989). 
The courts in several other jurisdictions have adopted the analysis, particularly in petitions 
for dissolution. See, e.g., O'Donnel v. Marine Repair Sews., 530 F. Supp. 1199, 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982); Stumpf v. C.E. Stumpf & Sons, Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 671, 673-75 (Ct. App. 1975); Jaffee 
Commercial Fin. Co. v. Harris, 456 N.E.2d 224, 229-32 (111. App. Ct. 1983); Exadaktilos v. 
Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 561-62 (N.J. Super. 1979). affd, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); In re Kemp & Beatley, 473 N.E.2d 1173,1179 (N.Y. 1984); In re Gene 
Barry One Hour Photo Processing, 444 N.Y.S.2d 540,543,545 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); In re Wiedy's 
Furniture Clearance Ctr. Co.. 487 N.Y.S.2d 901,903 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Baker v. Commercial 
Body Builders, 507 P.2d 387,393-95 (Or. 1973); see also Thompson, supra note 104, a t  216-19. 
127. O'Neal, supm note 108, a t  886 (emphasis added). 
128. See generally Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976); 
Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987). But see Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, 535 
N.E.2d 1311 (N.Y. 1989). In Zngle the court held a shareholder who was an at-will employee 
could be discharged under common law employee at-will and contract principles when the 
employee failed to plead that his discharge was designed to preclude his assertion of legal rights. 
Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales. 535 N.E.2d at  1314. In rejecting the assertion of an exception to 
these principles in the case of close corporations, the court stated: "No duty of loyalty and good 
faith akin to that between partners, precluding termination except for cause, arises among those 
operating a business in the corporate form who 'have only the rights, duties and obligations of 
stockholders' and not those of partners." Id. (quoting Weismann v. Awnair Corp., 144 N.E.2d 
415, 418 (N.Y. 1957)). The dissent offered a different perspective on the plight of the close 
corporation shareholder: 
[Wlhether it be lack of mutuality or lack of consideration, the rationale for the 
employment at-will rule does not fit the situation of the typical minority shareholder- 
participant in a close corporation. For such participant is not truly free to quit a t  any 
time; and there is considemtion which would support an implied understanding that, a t  
least, the mdority owner will not discharge him arbitrarily or in bad faith and without 
some legitimate business reason. Unlike the employee of a large corporation, the 
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the corporation,"l2Q equal opportunities to sell stock to the corporation,130 the 
continuation of long-standing distribution policies,lSl 'and meaningful 
participation in the management of the family busine~s."13~ In Meiselman v. 
Meiselman,lss the North Carolina Supreme Court explained that "reasonable 
expectationsn must be ascertained by 
examining the entire history of the participants' relationship. That 
history will include the 'reasonable expectations' created a t  the inception 
of the participants' relationship; those 'reasonable expectations' as 
altered over time; and the 'reasonable expectations' which develop as the 
participants engage in a course of dealing in conducting the affairs of the 
corporation. The interests and views of the other participants must be 
considered in determining 'reasonable expectations.' . . . [Tlhey must 
be known to or assumed by the other shareholders and concurred in by 
them. . . . Privately held expectations which are not made known to the 
other participants are not 'reasonable.'134 
As shareholder rights expand, the powers and prerogatives of the board 
of directors contract. Thus, when the immediate effect on minority share- 
holders is a freeze-out or a denial of other substantive rights as  discerned 
minority shareholder in a close corporation has typically invested a large percentage of 
his financial wherewithal in the business. He has been willing to do so because of what 
he expects will be his long-term association with the business and his ability to protect 
his investment and, he hopes, to make it grow. The same features of the minority 
owner-participant's status which makes him particularly vulnerable to action by the 
majority obviously work to compel him to stay on the job. He needs to do so to protect 
his investment and to share in any increase in its value. 
Id. at  1321 (Hancock, J., dissenting). 
129. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551,564-65 (N.C. 1983). 
130. See Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3, 9-11 (1st Cir. 1986); Donahue v. Rodd 
Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505,518 (Mass. 1975). 
131. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180-81 (N.Y. 1984). The close 
corporation in Kemp was incorporated to design and manufacture table linens and sundry 
tabletop items. Id. at  1176. One petitioner, Dissen, a minority stockholder, had been employed 
by the company for 42 years, serving as vice president and a director before he resigned. Id. The 
other petitioner, Gardstein, also a minority stockholder, had been employed by the company for 
35 years. Id. His employment was terminated in December 1980. Id. Apparent unhappiness 
surrounded petitioners' departure from the company. Id. Of particular concern, they no longer 
received any distribution of the company's earnings. Id. I t  had been a "long-standing company 
Mlicy to declare de facto dividends based on stock ownership in the form of 'extra compensation 
bonuses.'" Id. at  1180. '[Elither shortly before or shortly after petitioners' employment ended, 
this policy was changed." Id. Although extra compensation was still awarded by the company, i t  
was no longer based on stock ownership, but on services rendered to the corporation. Id. "[Tlhis 
change in policy amounted to nothing less than an attempt to exclude petitioners from gaining 
any return on their investment through the mere recharacterization of distributions of corporate 
income." Id. 
132. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 558,565. 
133. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983). 
134. Id. a t  563. 
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from their reasonable expectations, a defense that the board's act is 
supported by a legitimate business purpose or was in the best interests of the 
corporation is i n ~ ~ c i e n t .  In a close corporation the authority of the board to 
act must be determined by an assessment of the parties' "reasonable expecta- 
tions." A court should ascertain the parties' understanding or agreements on 
the balance of power, participation in management and policy decisions, and 
the issues precipitating the bankruptcy solution. In Quarter Moon, the stock 
was evenly divided; the Gilberts therefore could reasonably expect that they 
would share control and decision-making, and that the corporation would not 
be placed in a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding without their consent. 
E. Dissolution as a Discretionary Remedy 
As the facts of Quarter Moon indicate, it was the Gilberts who first 
sought dissolution of the corporation under state law.135 Should the Gilberts 
therefore be allowed to complain about the corporation's petition to liquidate 
under the bankruptcy code? The court believed the Gilberts filed the state 
court action to dissolve because of unresolvable deadlock among the 
~hareholders.1~~ A number of state statutes provide for involuntary disso- 
lution on a showing of deadlock, but these statutes are generally interpreted 
to make dissolution discretionary even when deadlock is shown to exist.13' 
135. The Idaho Code gives a court the power to "liquidate the assets and business of a 
corporation" in an action by a shareholder upon a showing: 
(1) That the directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs and 
We shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and that irreparable injury to the 
corporation is being suffered or is threatened by reason thereof; or 
(2) That the acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation are illegal, 
oppressive or frauilulent and that irreparable injury to the corporation is being suffered 
or is threatened by reason thereof; or 
(3) That the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, and have failed, for a period 
which includes a t  least two (2) consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to 
directors whose terms have expired or would have expired upon the election of their 
successors[.] 
IDAHO CODE 8 30-1-97 (1948). The Idaho Code also provides that in proceedings to liquidate, 
'the court shall have power to issue injunctions, [and] to appoint a receiver, with such powers 
and duties as the court" deems proper. Id. 4 30-1-98. 
136. In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co.. 116 B.R. 775,781 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990). 
137. CARY & EISENBERC, supm note 107, a t  446; see also Gillingham v. Swan Falls Land 
& Cattle Co., 683 P.2d 895,897 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). In Gillinghnm, the court noted: 
When the statutory requirements for liquidating a deadlocked corporation are met, a 
court may liquidate the corporate assets, but is not compelled to do so. [Idaho Code 9 
30-1-971 gives the court discretion to grant or deny a petition . . . that discretion should 
be exercised in light of the relevant factors which are reflected in the circumstances of 
the case and the relevant interests which are to be served. 
Gillingham v. Swan Falls Land & Cattle Co., 683 P.2d a t  897. Consider also 4 14.30 of the 
Model Business Corp. Act, which states: 
Grounds for Judicial Dissolution 
The [ . . . court. . . I may dissolve a corporation: 
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Courts have been reluctant to order the dissolution of a profitable corporation 
on deadlock grounds when the attendant economic costs (loss of going concern 
value) and social costs (the effects of one person's conduct or consumption on 
the. welfare of others) overwhelm the expected benefits.l98 Although disso- 
. . . . 
(2) in a proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that: 
(i) the directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs, 
the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and irreparable injury to 
the corporation is threatened or being suffered, or the business and affairs of 
the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the 
shareholders generally, because of the deadlock; 
(ii) the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, 
or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent; 
(iii) the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and have failed, for a 
period that includes a t  least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect 
successors to directors whose terms have expired; or 
(iv) the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted. . . . 
MODEL BUSINESS mRP. ACT ANN. 9 14.30 (Supp. 1992); see also N.Y. BUS. WRP. LAW 8 1104-a 
(McKinney 1986). See generally John E. Davidian. Corporation Dissolution in New York: 
Liberalizing the Rights of Minority Shareholders, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 24 (1981). 
Shareholders in close corporations seek dissolution not solely because of deadlock, but often 
in response to conduct deemed oppressive or injurious to other rights or interests in the 
corporation. Courts have long maintained the power, based on equitable principles, to dissolve a 
corporation in cases involving oppression. See Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443,445-46 (Alaska 
1985); Rowland v. Rowland, 633 P.2d 599,605 (Idaho 1981); Liebert v. Clapp, 196 N.E.2d 540, 
541-42 (N.Y. 1963); Kruger v. Gerth, 255 N.Y.S.2d 498,500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 19641, affd rnem., 263 
N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. 1965). 
The concept of oppression resists precise definition in the statutes and cases, although most 
would agree the term contemplates certain unjust, unfair, and perhaps harsh, conduct. A useful 
articulation of the concept is found in a recent Oregon decision: 
[Oppression is1 "'burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct; a lack of probity and fair 
dealing in the affairs of a company to the prejudice of some of its members; or a visible 
departure from the standards of fair dealing, and a violation of fair play on which every 
shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely!" 
Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, 507 P.2d 387,393 (Or. 1973) (citations omitted). Illinois 
court described oppressive conduct as  an 'arbitrary, overbearing and heavy-handed course of 
conduct." Compton v. Paul K Harding Realty Co., 285 N.E.2d 574,581 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972). 
Reasonable expectations analysis has found application in oppression cases. In Kemp & 
Beatlq: the court stated: 
[Tlhe question [of oppression] has been resolved by considering oppressive actions to 
refer to conduct that substantially defeats the 'reasonable expectations' held by 
minority shareholders in committing their capital to the particular enterprise. . . . A 
shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the corporation would entitle 
him or her to a job, a share of corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, or 
some other form of security, would be oppressed in a very real sense when others in the 
corporation seek to defeat those expectations and there exists no effective means of 
salvaging the investment. 
In re Kemp v. Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173,1179 (N.Y. 1984); see also Stefano v. Coppock, 705 
P.2d at 446; Graham v. Mimms, 444 N.E.2d 549,556-60 (Ill. App. Ct: 1982); Balvik v. Sylvester, 
411 N.W.2d 383,385-88 (N.D. 1987). 
138. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). In a dissolution 
of a profitable enterprise, participants suffer a loss of going-concern value of their investment. 
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lution for profitable companies may function as a price-fucing mechanism for 
an eventual buy-out, it is a cumbersome, inefficient, and costly process.139 In 
addition, the general reluctance to order a profitable firm's dissolution also 
reflects a sense that the reasons for seeking this remedy include issues other 
than the firm's ability to function. 
thereby reducing the total capital available for reinvestment or other consumption; employees 
suffer loss of employment and consequently a loss of net income; suppliers s d e r  a reduction of 
income from the loss of a customer; and consumers generally may suffer losses in the form of 
higher prices to the extent that the dissolution produces a measurable loss in competition. There 
are similar costa associated with bankruptcy: 
In practice, bankruptcy is not costless, but generally involves an  aGudication 
process which itself consumes a fraction of the remaining value of the asseta of the 
firm. Thus the cost of bankruptcy will be of concern to potential buyers of fmed claims 
in the firm since their existence will reduce the payoffs to them in the event of 
bankruptcy . . . . The price buyers will be willing to pay for fuced claims will thus be 
inversely related to the probability of bankruptcy. 
. . . . h the probability of bankruptcy increases, both the operating costs and the 
revenues of the firm are adversely affected. . . . For example, a firm with a high 
probability of bankruptcy will also find that it must pay higher salaries to induce 
executives to accept the higher risk of unemployment. Furthermore, in certain kinds of 
durable goods industries the demand function for the firm's product will not be 
independent of the probability of bankruptcy. The computer industry is a good 
example. There, the buyer's welfare is dependent to a significant extent on the ability 
to maintain the equipment, and on continuous hardware and software development. 
Furthermore, the owner of a large computer often receives benefits from the software 
developments of other users. Thus if the manufacturer leaves the business or loses his 
software support and development experts because of financial difficulties, the value of 
the equipment to his users will decline. The buyers of such services have a continuing 
interest in the manufacturer's viability[,] [with] their benefits com[ing] in the form of 
continuing services a t  lower cost. 
Herbert L. Jensen & William H. Meckling. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and 0.wnership Structure. 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,320 (1976); see also J.A.C. Hetherington & 
Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining 
Close Corpomtion Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 27-34 (1977); Carlos L. Israels, Problem of 
Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 778 (1952); Steven Wimpfheimer & Susan Dunn, 
Corpomte Squeeze Out: Aspects of Valuation, 58 N.Y.S.B.J. 32 (1986); Recent Cases, Deadlocked 
Corpomtion Warrants Dismissal of Dissolution Petition Without a Hearing. 68 HARV. L. REV. 
714 (1955). 
A number of courts have also recognized the costa associated with bankruptcy. See Hendley 
v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317,1324 (D.S.C. 1987); Rowland v. Rowland, 633 P.2d 599, 606 (Idaho 
1981); Poliakoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 184 N.E.2d 792, 795-96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962); Fix v. 
Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358-59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Gonseth v. K & K Oil Co., 439 
S.W.2d 18,26-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); In re Radom & Neidorff, 119 N.E.2d 563,565 (N.Y. 1954); 
Baker v. Commercial Body Builders. 507 P.2d 387, 395 (Or. 1973). But see Stumpf v. C.E. 
Stumpf & Sons, Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 671,674-75 (Ct. App. 1975); Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated 
Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960); see also N.Y. BUSINESS CORP. LAW 8 
l l l l(bX3) (McKinney 1992) ('dissolution is not to be denied merely because it is found that the 
corporate business has been or could be conducted a t  a profit"); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, 
MODEL WATUTORY CLOSE CORP. m P .  9 43(b) (1989). 
139. Hetherington & Dooley, supm note 138, at  27-34. 
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[Elxcept for the rare case where the petition is prompted by pique, a 
shareholder suing for dissolution is trying to accomplish one of three 
things: (1) to withdraw his investment from the firm; (2) to induce the 
other shareholders to sell out to him; (3) to use the threat of dissolution 
to induce the other shareholders to agree to a change in the balance of 
power or in the policies of the firm.lqO 
Two often cited New York cases illustrate the parties' and the courts' 
dilemma in these cases. In In re Radom & Neidorff; Znc.,"' Henry NeidorfT 
and his brother-in-law, David Radom, were the sole and equal shareholders of 
a corporation engaged in the business of printing musical  composition^.^^^ 
Henry died and left his stock to his wife, Anna, who was also David's sister.143 
Anna and David were estranged, and five months after Henry's death, David 
brought a proceeding to dissolve the corporation under the state statute.144 
David's petition stated that the corporation was successful, but Anna had 
refused to cooperate with David as  president and had refused to sign his 
salary checks, thereby making it impossible to elect directors because of 
unresolved agreements.145 
The court of appeals reversed the lower court's order granting dissolu- 
tion.lq6 They apparently relied in part on the statute, which provided that "if 
upon the application for the final order for involuntary dissolution i t  shall 
appear that . . . dissolution will be beneficial to the stockholders [or members] 
. . . and not injurious to the public, the court must make a final order dissolv- 
ing the corporation."147 Nevertheless, the court explained that its power to 
order the dissolution of a corporation was discretionary and there was no 
absolute right to dissolution under the  circumstance^.^^ Instead, the order is 
granted only when the competing interests "are so discordant as to prevent 
efficient management' and the 'object of its corporate existence cannot be 
attained.'"149 "[Tlhe primary inquiry is, always . . . whether judicially- 
im$osed death 'will be beneficial to the stockholders or members and not 
injurious to the public.'"lm 
140. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 138, at 27. The authors propose a statutory 
reform to provide each shareholder with an automatic and unconditional right to demand that 
the corporation or the remaining shareholders purchase his sharee at a price determined by 
agreement or appraisal. Hetherington & Dooley, supm note 138. at 1-3,6. 
141. In re Radom & Neideroff, 119 N.E.2d 563 (N.Y. 1954). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 563-64. 
145. Id. at 564. 
146. Id. at 565. 
147. Id. at 569 (Fuld, J., dissenting). 
148. Id. at 565. 
149. Id. (quoting In re Importers' & Grocers' Exch., 30 N.E. 401,404 (N.Y. 1892)). 
150. Id. (quoting In re Importers' & Grocers' Exch., 30 N.E. at 404). 
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The corporation a t  issue was flourishing and making profits.lS1 Thus, 
court-ordered dissolution would leave Anna with only the liquidated value of 
the corporate assets, while David would have the going-concern value because 
he had the skill and associations to continue to operate the business.lS2 
In Wollman v. Littman,ls3 the stock of the corporation was held equally 
by two distinct groups.lW Each group had equal representation on the board 
of directors.155 The corporation sold fabrics to garment manufacturer~.~~6 The 
plaintiffs were the daughters of the main stockholder of Louis Nierenberg, 
Inc., who procured the fabrics and sold them to the corporation.ls7 In an 
earlier suit, the defendants charged that the plaintiffs and Logs  Nierenberg, 
Inc. had lured away the corporation's customers to Louis Nierenberg, Inc., 
and had engaged in  other "acts to affect the corporation's business 
adversely."l58 The plaintiffs countered with the suit for dissolution, claiming 
the earlier action indicated effective management was irnpo~sible.~~g The 
court explained that "irreconcilable differences even among an  evenly divided 
board of directors do not in all cases mandate dissolution."160 Rather, 
a dissolution which will render nugatory the relief sought in the repre- 
sentative action would actually accomplish the wrongful purpose . . . [the 
Nierenbergs] are charged with in that action. It would not only squeeze 
the Littmans out of the business but would require the receiver to  
dispose of the inventory with the Nierenbergs the only interested 
purchaser financially strong enough to take advantage of the situation. 
Such a result, if supported by the facts, would be intolerable to a court of 
equity. 161 
Under the terms of [the current New Yorkl statute, courts are 
instructed to consider both whether riquidation of the corporation is the 
only feasible means to protect the complaining shareholder's expectation 
of a fair return on his or her investmentn and whether "dissolution 'is 
reasonably necessary' td protect 'the rights or interests of any substantial 
number of shareholders' not limited to those ~omplaining."'~~ 
151. Id. at 564. 
152. See Abram Chayes, Madam Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1532,1546-47 (1960) for an interesting comment on this case. 
153. Wollman v .  Littman, 316 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1970). 








162. In re Kemp & Beatley, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799,806 (N.Y. 1984). "Every order of dissolution, 
however, must be conditioned upon permitting any shareholder of the corporation to elect to 
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This limitation on a shareholder's right to dissolve has both philosoph- 
ical and practical foundations. A right to withdraw capital from the firm, by 
an automatic buy-out provision or dissolution, may encourage opportunistic 
behavior by the minority. Persons with a relatively smaller stake in the 
enterprise are given the ability to impose costs on the others that would not 
be incurred under traditional fiduciary duty analysis, which requires a 
showing of some kind of fault for dissolution.163 An absolute right to dissolve 
or withdraw capital would reverse the basic corporation majority rule 
principle and perhaps unfairly deprive the majority of a bargained-for veto of 
corporate dec i~ i0ns . l~~  Similarly, a board of directors' unilateral power to 
dissolve the corporation through bankruptcy denies minority or non- 
controlling shareholders bargained-for and law-given rights, including those 
derived from reasonable expectations. In the context of intracorporate 
disputes, these rights include not only the right to vote on a fundamental 
matter like a dissolution, but also a right to a hearing on the wisdom and 
necessity of a dissolution and a right to a consideration of alternatives to 
dissolution. . 
V. LACK OF GOOD FAITH UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
Earlier in this Article some recent nonfinancial, but "tactical" and 
"creativen uses of the Bankruptcy Code by large, public corporations were 
noted.165 Those who have studied the issue argue that such strategic uses by 
close and public corporations are not unqualified, but are limited by a "good 
faith" test.166 Although the 1978 Bankruptcy Code did not expressly require 
purchase the complaining shareholder's stock a t  fair value.* Id. (citing N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 
1118 (McKinney 1979) (amended 1986)). 
163. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supm note 103,s 9.06. 
164. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supm note 103.5 9.06. 
165. See supm text accompanying notes 69-99. 
166. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supm note 19, a t  947. See genemlly D OUGLASS G. BAIRD & 
THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY (2d ed. 1990); 
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986); Thomas H. 
Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and 
the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 (1989); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U .  
CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987); David Gray Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341 
(1987) (reviewing THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986)). 
Some scholars have argued these new strategic and technical uses of bankruptcy reveal 
deeper problems residing in our economic and commercial systems. Petitioners are not solely 
~eeking relief in a common pool problem, but rule changes: in labor law, the right unilaterally to 
terminate a collective bargaining agreement (as Continental and Eastern Airlines sought); in 
property law, the right to modify the force of a lien (like Texaco in the Pennzoil litigation); in tort 
law, the right to limit the amount and types of recoverable damages (as Johns-Manville in the 
asbestos litigation). See JACKSON, supm, a t  195; Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 19, a t  968. 
Consider the following scenario: A debtor forms a new corporation on the eve of bankruptcy and 
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that a voluntary liquidation petition be filed in "good faith," a 1984 
amendment added section 707(b), which provides that a Chapter 7 petition, 
in the limited context of an individual consumer debtor, may be dismissed if 
the court finds the filing to be a substantial abuse of the spirit of the law.167 
Even before the enactment of section 707(b), a considerable body of case law 
had developed that supports the theory that the bankruptcy court has the 
inherent power to dismiss any voluntary petition filed for fraudulent 
purposes or lacking good faith.168 The good faith test has at least two aspects; 
one concerned with accomplishing the end purposes of the bankruptcy 
process, with primary reference to federal law, and the other concerned with 
protecting the sanctity of the court from abusive and fraudulent conduct, as 
these are conceived under state 
A. Achieving the End Purposes of Bankruptcy 
In a recent examination of the issue, two scholars170 described the two 
predominant schools of thought on the purpose of bankruptcy. They wrote of 
"collectivismn and "the traditional theory."171 Collectivism holds that the 
the secured assets of the debtor are placed in that new corporation. The corporation then files for 
bankruptcy. Jackson points out this is clearly not a common pool problem: 
Instead, they reflect the consequences of a shift in relative values. . . . When the effect 
of using bankruptcy is to under-compensate secured creditors, delay works to the 
interest of the debtor or unsecured creditors because some of the costs of the delay are 
borne by the secured creditors. Such under-compensation, therefore, reflects another 
change in relative values that induces bankruptcy filings for purposes other than 
solving common pool problems. 
JACKSON, supm, a t  185. The mixed motive cases present a difficult problem, however, as  the 
exercise of jurisdiction in such cases may in fact accomplish some sort ofrule change, or a t  a 
minimum, some shift in the balance of power between the parties. The courts should accept only 
"those cases where there is likely to be a common pool problem and to exclude those cases that 
are likely to be fueled simply by a selfish claimant seeking a strategic advantage." JACKSON, 
supra, a t  199. 
167. 11 U.S.C. 8 707(b) (1986); see also GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 109 (2d ed. 1988) ('Only the court itself and the United States trustee have 
standing to raise this ground."). 
168. See, e.g., Porterfield v. Gerstel, 222 F.2d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1955); Zeitinger v. 
Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 244 F. 719, 722-23 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 667 
(1917); see also JACKSON,supm note 166, a t  193-203; TREISTER et al., supra note 167, a t  109; 
Daniel J. Tyukody, Jr., Good Faith Inquiries Under the Bankruptcy Code: Treating the Symptom, 
Not the Cause, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1985). The good faith filing cases are legion. For a 
comprehensive collection and discussion of these cases, see Ordin, in* note 178 and Ponoroff & 
Knippenberg, supm note 19. For a history of the good faith requirement in bankruptcy doctrine 
see In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 549,551-60 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981). 
169. See In  re Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Johns 
Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727,733-38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Dutch Flat Inv. Co., 6 B.R. 470, 
471-72 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Northwest Recreational Activities, 4 B.R. 36,38-43 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 1980). 
170. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 19, a t  919. 
171. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 19, a t  948. 
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single end purpose of bankruptcy is or should be efficient debt c01lection.l~~ 
Under this theory, "bankruptcy is properly invoked only in response to a 
common pool problem . . . [i.e., a] situation created when a debtor's assets are 
insf icient  to satisfy the demands of a common pool of claimants,"173 and for 
the purpose of achieving maximum asset ~ a 1 u e s . l ~ ~  The traditional view 
holds that "the bankruptcy system is and should be designed to address a 
broad range of interests affected by the collapse of a debtor enterprise."176 "It 
avoids relegating the bankruptcy process to the status of a mere alternate 
debt collection device by seeking to protect the interest of non-creditors . . . 
victims of firm failure [that] would otherwise lack a champion."17s This view 
"regards the central purpose of bankruptcy. . . as the apportionment of losses 
occasioned by firm collapse according to a set of principles, none of which 
being pre-eminent by definition."l77 
One may invoke the protective provisions of the bankruptcy laws only 
for the historical and expressed legislative aims of bankruptcy.17s Under 
- - - - 
172. Ponoroff & Knippenberg. supm note 19, a t  949-50. 
173. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supm note 19, a t  950. 
174. Ponoroff & Knippenberg. supm note 19, a t  950-51. "Collectivism' . . . should be 
taken to mean the set of shared fundamental assumptions and postulates of a group of scholars 
writing mainly from an economics-based perspective of the law." Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supm 
note 19, at 949. Another commentator writes: 
Bankruptcy law hi'storically has done two things: allowed for some sort of a financial 
fresh start for individuals and provided creditors with a compulsory and collective 
forum to sort out their relative entitlemerit to a debtor's assets. 
JACKSON. supm note 162, a t  4. 
175. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supm note 19, a t  961. 
176. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supm note 19. a t  960. 
177. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supm note 19. a t  962. The authors state their own view: 
First, we assume that no fixed purpose or even set of purposes is discoverable or, for 
that  matter, imminent in the law of bankruptcy. . . . [Wle deny the permanent 
hegemony of a n  original first principle and, concomitantly, of a systematically 
knowable, ideal bankruptcy policy a t  work that is merely imperfectly expressed in 
bankruptcy law. The search for an  immutable, ideal purpose or set of purposes is, 
therefore, necessarily an exercise in normative advocacy, not discovery. 
Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supm note 19, a t  962. The authors note that 'courts have shown no 
inclination to reduce the number or limit the kinds of problems brought to the bankruptcy forum 
according to a single, agreed upon fundamental principle." Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supm note 
19, a t  966. 
[Rather,] bankruptcy has evolved into a legal institution to which commercial concerns, 
both large and small, have turned to resolve basic business and economic problems that 
are not satisfactorily addressed elsewhere. In many instances, these problems are 
related only incidentally, if a t  all, to the problems of default and immediate financial 
ruin. 
Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 19, a t  966. The courts have strived to limit access to 
bankruptcy relief based on the good faith test. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supm note 19, a t  970. 
178. I n  re Mogul, 17 B.R. 680,681 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); see also I n  re Levinsky, 23 B.R. 
210,215 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); I n  re 299 Jack-Hemp Assoc., 20 B.R. 412,413 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1982); I n  re Century City, Inc., 8 B.R. 25,31 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980); I n  re G-2 Realty Trust, 6 B.R. 
549,552 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); I n  re Tolco Properties, Inc., 6 B.R. 482,487 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
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either theory, a petition which reflects an intent to abuse the judicial process 
and the purpose of the code provisions179 is inconsistent with the purposes of 
bankruptcylaO and may be dismissed as lacking good faith.lal For example, 
courts have held the following tactics reflect a lack of good faith, and have 
dismissed petitions furthering them: Creating and organizing a new business 
rather than reorganizing, rehabilitating, or preserving an existing viable 
business;la2 evading contractual obligations;lS3 and delaying exercise of 
secured creditors' legitimate state law rights and remedies.le4 Also, petitions 
filed solely to create the automatic stay,la5 to carry out tax avoidance 
1980); In re Dutch Flat Inv. Co., 6 B.R. 470, 471 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980); In re Northwest 
Recreational Activities, 4 B.R. 36,42 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); JACKSON, supm note 166, a t  1 9 4  
95. See genemlly Robert L. Ordin, The Good Faith Principle in the Bankruptcy Code: A Case 
Study, 38 BUS. LAW. 1795 (1983); Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supm note 19. 
179. In Chapter 11 cases, findings of lack of good faith have been based on the presence of 
certain recumng, but nonexclusive factors: the debtor has few or no unsecured creditors, the 
debtor or a related entity filed a previous bankruptcy petition, the petition effectively allows the 
debtor to evade court orders, the debtor has engaged in improper prepetition conduct, the debtor 
has few debts to nonmoving creditors, the petition was filed on the eve of foreclosure and the 
foreclosed property is the debtor's sole or major asset, the debtor has no ongoing business or 
employees, there is no possibility of reorganization, the debtor's income is not sufficient to 
operate the business, there is no pressure from nonmoving creditors, reorganization essentially 
involves the resolution of a two-party dispute, or a corporate debtor was formed and received title 
to its major assets immediately before the petition. See In re Albany Partners, LM., 749 F.2d 
670, 674 (11th Cir. 1984); In re Northwest Place, LM., 108 B.R. 809, 814-15 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1988); In re Turner, 80 B.R. 618,622-23 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); In re Levinsky, 23 B.R. 210,217 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Victory Constr. Co.. 9 B.R. 549,551-52 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); In 
re G-2 Realty Trust, 6 B.R. 549,552 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); In re Dutch Flat Inv. Co., 6 B.R. a t  
471-72. The court in Turner lamented that the 'drafters of the Bankruptcy Code gave the courts 
an empty chalice in the bad faith standard." In re Turner, 80 B.R. a t  622-23. Some of the 
decisions suggest that "two views have developed . . . , one requiring actual malice or the desire 
to harass or embarrass, and the other finding bad faith when the bankruptcy court is used as a 
substitute for customary collection procedures." Id. a t  622. The court held that "bad faith . . . 
should be measured by the subjective and objective standards contained in Bankruptcy Rule 
9011," which, tracking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, requires a pleading be based on a 
reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law. Id. at  623. This view was adopted by the Fourth 
Circuit in Camlin Corp. v. Miller. 886 F.2d 693, 700-01 (4th Cir. 1989). Most of the "good faith" 
cases have arisen in Chapter 11 reorganization cases. See TREISTER, supm note 167, at 109. 
180. See JACKSON, supm note 166, a t  195. 
181. East-West Assocs. v. Nastasi-White, Inc., 106 B.R. 767, 771 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); 
In re Grieshop, 63 B.R. 657,664 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986). 
182. In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 549,564 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981). 
183. In re Savoy Record Co., 108 F. Supp. 957,958-59 (D.N.J. 1952). 
184. Phoenix Picadilly, Ltd. v. Life Ins. Co., 849 F.2d 1393, 1394 (11th Cir. 1988); Natural 
Land Corp. v. Baker Farms, Inc., 825 F.2d 296,298 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Albany Partners, Ltd. 
v. Westbrook, 749 F.2d at  674). 
185. In re Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d 1068, 1071-72 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Grieshop, 63 
B.R. a t  663. Dismissal on this ground has been limited to cases in which the debtor lacked any 
intention to reorganize and save the property or the equity through a plan providing for 
refinancing, sale, or other arrangement. See Cinema Sew. Corp. v. Edbee Corp., 774 F.2d 584, 
585 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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schemes,lm or as a litigation tacticla' have been held to reflect a lack of good 
faith resulting in dismissal of the petitions.la8 On the same reasoning, a 
petition filed not for the purpose of addressing a common pool problem or the 
collapse of a debtor enterprise, but to preempt one faction in a n  
intracorporate dispute in a state judicial dissolution proceeding, should be 
dismissed by the bankruptcy court. 
B. Abusive Conduct 
By turning away "debtors whose overriding motive is to achieve repre- 
hensible purposes" and limiting the exercise of the courts' equitable powers to 
those debtors who come with "clean hands," the second aspect of the good 
faith test guards not only the court's jurisdictional reach, but also its 
integrity.189 A bankruptcypetition filed in breach of a state law fiduciary 
duty is this sort of threatening conduct.1g0 The decision in Porterfield v. 
Gerstellgl is instructive on this point. There, a close corporation was engaged 
in the business of purchasing raw aluminum and converting it into extruded 
products.lg2 The board was composed of five members.lg3 Three members, 
who together owned fifty percent of the corporation's stock, voted to file a 
186. In  re Maxim Indus., 22 B.R. 611,612-13 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982). 
187. See, e.g.,In re Harvey, 101 B.R. 250 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1989); In re Holm, 75 B.R. 86 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987); In  re Karum Group, Inc., 66 B.R. 436 (Bankr. W.D. Wash, 1986). See 
genemlly Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supm note 19, a t  938-39. 
188. See generally Bacon & Spies, Bad Faith Bankruptcies, 26 HOUS. LAW. 33 (1985); 
Frank R. Kennedy, Creative Bankruptcy? Use a d  Abuse of the Bankruptcy Law-Reflection on 
Some Recent Cases, 71 IOWA L. REV. 199 (1985); Ordin, supm note 178; Daniel J. Tyukody, Jr., 
Note, Good Faith Inquiries Under the Bankruptcy Code: Treating the Symptom, Not the Cause, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1985). For a discussion of recent %cticalW and "creative" uses of Chapter 
11 filings, see Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supm note 19, a t  919-20. 
Reorganization plans must also be filed in good faith. Section 1129(a) provides: T h e  court 
shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met: . . . (3) [tlhe plan has been 
proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law." 11 USC 8 1129(a). To meet the 
"good faith" requirement, "courta have held that a reorganization plan must bear some relation 
to the statutory objective of resuscitating a financially troubled corporation." In re Coastal Cable 
T.V., 709 F.2d 762. 765 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Fidelity Assurance Aseoc. v. Sims, 318 U.S. 608 
(1943); Tennessee Publishing Co. v. American Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 18, 22 (1936); Lemm v. 
Northern Cal. Nat l  Bank, 93 F.2d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 1937); In  re Nikron, Inc., 27 B.R. 773, 778 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 B.R. 367,370 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982); In  re 
BBT, 11 B.R. 224,235-36 (Bankr. D. Nev:1981); Ordin, supm note 178, a t  1827-28. 
189. In re Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d a t  1072 (5th Cir. 1986); see also In re Dutch Flat 
Inv. Co., 6 B.R. 470,472 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Northwest Recreational Activities, 4 B.R. 
36,39 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). 
190. Porterfield v. Gerstel, 222 F.2d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1955); In re Klein's Outlet, 50 F. 
Supp. 557,559 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). 
191. Porterfield v. Gerstel, 222 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1955). 
192. Porterfield v. Gerstel. 249 F.2d 634,635 n.l(5th Cir. 1957) (quoting the opinion of the 
referee in bankruptcy). 
193. Porterfield v. Gerstel. 222 F.2d a t  138. 
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voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.lW The other stockholders moved to 
vacate the order of adjudication of bankruptcy, contending the three directors 
fraudulently put the company into bankruptcy to freeze out the other 
stockholders and minority directors.lgs 
The movants asserted that less than a month before the bankruptcy 
petition was filed, the three defendant directors bought their fifty percent 
interest from the original owners, along with certain debentures of the corpo- 
ration and other loans, investing directly and indirectly $148,000.1g6 
Thereafter, the three were elected to the board.lg7 One of these directors 
"advanced $30,000 to the company on a [ninety] day note, and . . . 
represented . . . he would advance such other funds as the company needed 
and secure a line of credit of $100,000 [at a low rate] if the stockholders would 
elect him a s  a director and chairman of the board."lg8 The stockholders 
elected him on this representation, giving the new stockholders a majority on 
the board.lg9 The movants claimed the newcomers had no intent to fulfill 
their promises; instead, they were conspiring to "get control of the corporation 
. . . and put i t  into bankruptcy for the sole purpose of wiping out the interests 
of [the m o ~ a n t s ] . " ~ ~ ~  Furthermore, "immediately after acquiring a majority 
position, . . . the newcomers . . . diverted funds of the corporation . . . and will- 
fully injured the corporation's credit.-O1 
The movants alleged the company was solvent and earning a profit.202 
Although the corporation was solvent in the bankruptcy sense-its assets 
exceeded its liabilities by approximately $80,000-it was insolvent in the 
equity sense because it was unable to pay its bills as  they matured.203 The 
directors asserted the company was "'running overdrafts in the bank; . . . 
borrowing from its officeq [and] failing to pay its aluminum suppliers,'" all 
of which could have meant the end of the company.204 
The bankruptcy referee denied the motion to vacate, and the district 
court sustained the ruling.205 The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the 
case to the district court with instructions to order the bankruptcy referee to 
conduct a further hearing, giving the bankruptcy trustee an  opportunity to 
meet the prima facie case made out by the challenging shareholders, or, in 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 




200. Id. There was testimony to the effect that the defendant directors repeatedly said 
they would own the business after the.proceedings were concluded. Id. at 141. 
201. Id. at 139. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 138-39. 
204. Portersfield v. Gerstel, 249 F.2d 634,635 n.l(5th Cir. 1957) (quoting the opinion of 
the refeke in bankruptcy). 
205. Portersfield v. Gerstel, 222 F.2d at 137. 
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default, to sustain the shareholders' motion to set aside the adjudication of 
voluntary bankruptcy.206 The court noted: 
The law permits any ordinary business corporation to file a petition in 
bankruptcy to avail itself of the benefits of the bankruptcy statute. 
Ordinarily i t  is unimportant what may be the purpose or motive of the 
corporation, if in truth and in fact i t  is the act of the corporation and not 
of officers or directors acting for their own benefit as distinguished from 
that of the corporation to which they have a fiduciary resp~nsibility.~~' 
The court further explained that if the allegations of the challenging share- 
holders were true, the referee should have vacated the order of 
adjudication.2O8 Filing the petition "would be a fraud on the court as well as a 
fraud on the corporation and its other stockholders."209 Other courts have 
dismissed petitions filed to resolve a dispute over ownership and control of a 
nondebtor corporation210 and to deprive a former spouse of any interest in the 
enterprise because they lacked good faith.211 
- - - 
206. Id. 
207. Id. a t  140 (footnotes omitted). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. On remand, the referee heard additional testimony, reviewed documentary 
evidence (including checks and minutes of the corporation), and again concluded that there was a 
good faith financial basis for the petition. Porterfield v. Gerstel, 249 F.2d 634, 635 (5th Cir. 
1957). The district court confirmed the referee's order. Id. at  635. Because the court of appeals 
could not say that the district court's findings were clearly erroneous, the judgment was 
affirmed. Id. a t  637. 
210. In re Colden Ocala Partnership. 50 B.R. 552,558 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985). 
211. In re Stamford Color Photo, 105 B.R. 204,208 (Bankr. D. Corn. 1989); see also In re 
Bicoastal Corp., 109 B.R. 467,471 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); In re Justus Hospitality Properties, 
Ltd., 86 B.R. 261,264 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988). But see In re Stolrow's, Inc., 84 B.R. 167 (Bankr. 
9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting challenge that sole motivation for the petition was to secure a tactical 
advantage in dispute over control because debtor was capable of satisfying the statutory 
requirement of proposing a plan in good faith which preserved going concern value and jobs). 
Compare, however, In re Beck-Rumbaugh, No. 854233.1985 WL 38 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11,1985). in 
which the court followed principles stated in Portersfreld v. Gerstel, but expressed a different 
view on the court's role in addressing the alleged abuse. In Beck-Rumbaugh, the board of 
directors filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Rumbaugh, a 49% shareholder and a 
judgment creditor of the company (as a result of a state court judgment against the company) 
moved to dismiss the proceeding. Id. at  *l. Rumbaugh charged a 'fraudulent intentionn on the 
part of Beck, the 51% shareholder and president of the company, that is, 'a ploy to stay litigation 
on behalf of the corporation against the president and others for diversion of corporate funds." 
Id. at  '4. The court recited the rule that 'a bad faith filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 to 
defeat claims of creditors may be found to be fraud on the court and other parties." Id. But, 
rather than dismiss the petition on this ground, the court ruled: 
[Tlhe matters referred to by [Rumbaughl in his motion papers regarding other 
litigation . . . make clear that i t  is only in Bankruptcy Court that the affairs of this 
corporate entity can be untangled and if i t  is not now insolvent, litigation costs and 
numerous judgments may soon render i t  so. Proceeding in Bankruptcy Court a t  this 
time will permit a thorough investigation of any improprieties and preserve the assete 
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Courts have resisted calculating petitioners' efforts to convert the 
bankruptcy process into a refuge for the evasion of state law duties and obli- 
gations. In In re Cook212 a state court ordered an accounting by the debtors, 
but granted an  extension of time within which to file the report.213 Ten days 
before the new deadline, the debtors filed for bankruptcy.214 The creditors 
argued the bankruptcy petition was filed- to avoid the state court's order on 
the accounting.216 The court stated: 
Thus, i t  appears plainly that the instant proceeding was instituted not 
for the purpose of obtaining benefits afforded by the Act to a corporation 
in financial distress, but to enable appellees to escape the jurisdiction of 
another court where the day of reckoning for their alleged acts of rniscon- 
d u d  was a t  hand. I t  is our conclusion that a [flederal [clourt should not 
extend its jurisdiction under such circumstances. To do so is to furnish a 
haven of repose for one accused and called to account by a court of compe- 
tent jurisdiction. I t  is argued that an accounting may be required in the 
[flederal [clourt as effectively as in the state court. No doubt this is true, 
but i t  does not dispel appellees' motives in shifting jurisdictions under 
the circumstances presented. Their conduct and the demonstrated 
purpose of coming into the [flederal [clourt was a fraud, not only upon 
that court, but the state court as 
As shown, shareholder rights under the close corporation doctrine are 
broader and qualitatively different than those under traditional corporation 
doctrine. They are extended by the parties' "reasonable expectations." A 
Chapter 7 petition not ratified by the shareholders of a close corporation that 
is not financially distressed defeats the reasonable expectations of a fifty 
percent shareholder in the continued participation in decision-making in the 
enterprise. The bankruptcy deprives the excluded shareholder of a state law 
right to a hearing on the merits of a dissolution and a consideration of alter- 
natives. This unauthorized petition fails the "good faith" test under the 
jurisdictional reach aspect, because there is no common-pool problem or a 
collapse of a debtor enterprise, and also under the abusive conduct aspect 
when its sole purpose is to deny the rights of others. 
of the debtor's estate. Appointment of a Trustee in Bankruptcy is clearly in the 
interests of the administration of justice. 
Id. (citations omitted). This view on the competence of a bankruptcy court to address abusive 
conduct is misguided. 
212. In re Cook, 104 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1939). 
213. Id. at 982. 
214. Id. at 983. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 985 (citations omitted). Porter@ld and Cook were decided under earlier 
versions of the Code. However, as stated, courts have always insisted upon the presence of good 
faith under all versions of the Code and even in the absence of any specific provision requiring it. 
See In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 549,551 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981) for a history of the good 
faith requirement. 
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C. State Courts are Better Suited to Resolve Intracorporate Disputes 
In Quarter Moon, the Gilberts argued the state court was better suited 
to adjust the rights and interests of all the relevant parties.217 They argued 
that in a state court proceeding the company, rather than liquidate the 
enterprise, could "liquidate sufficient assets to pay all creditor claims and to 
'cash out' the Addlemans' equity in the company, with the remaining items of 
property to be distributed to  the Gilberts so the . . . business could 
continue."21s The bankruptcy court responded that "Chapter 7 was carefully 
crafted by Congress to achieve a prompt, economical liquidation and a fair 
distribution of assets," and the "[tlrustee . . . is a professional, and the Court 
stands prepared to protect the interests of any party requiring it."219 
Moreover, the court stated that Ttlhe success of such an approach would 
require [the] Gilberts to convince the state court that such is a desirable and 
legal alternative, potentially over the objection of [the] Addlemans.%O 
The bankruptcy court might have considered declining jurisdiction 
under the abstention provisions of the Code when the "interests of creditors 
and the debtor would be better served" by a dismissal or suspension of 
pro~eedings.2~~ These provisions are designed to encourage private, negoti- 
ated adjustments of creditor-company relations and "to allow out-of-court 
insolvency arrangements to continue if those arrangements are in the best 
interest of all concerned and the petition is filed by 'recalcitrant c r e d i t ~ r s . ' " ~  
Although the Code fails to define the "interests" to be considered or to 
delineate criteria for determining when parties will be better served in or out 
of bankruptcy, courts have identified a number of relevant considerations. 
These include efficiency and economy in resolution of the matter, freedom 




221. Section 305 provides: 
(a) The Court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss a case under this title, or may 
suspend all proceedings in a case under this title, a t  any time if- 
(1) The interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal or 
suspension. 
11 U.S.C. 0 305 (1988). 
222. In re Colonial Ford, 24 B.R. 1014 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). According to the legislative 
history: 
This section recognizes that there are cases in which it would be appropriate for the 
court to decline jurisdiction. Abstention under this section, however, is of jurisdiction 
over the entire case . . . . The court may dismiss or suspend under the first paragraph, 
for example, if an arrangement is being worked out by the creditors and the debtor out 
of court, there is no prejudice to the rights of creditors in that arrangement, and an  
insolvency case has been commenced by a few recalcitrant creditors to provide a basis 
for future threats to extract full payment. 
H.R. REP. No. 989,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6281. 
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from litigation, as well as  "fairness, priorities in distribution, [the court's] 
capacity for dealing with frauds and preferences, and the importance of a 
discharge to the debtor."223 Equally significant in this regard is the 
motivation of the petitioners. 
The holding in Win-Sum Sports, I ~ c . ~ ~ ~  addresses this point. A fifty 
percent shareholder of a close corporation, who was also a creditor, entered 
into an agreement with other creditors to file an involuntary petition against 
the corporation.225 Although i t  was not disputed that the company was 
experiencing financial difficulties, "two of the three petitioning creditors 
testified that neither of them would have brought the involuntary petition 
had each not received a written indemnity agreement" from the petitioning 
shareholder.226 In fact, "except for the three creditor petitioners' debts," the 
corporation had "paid or made acceptable arrangements to pay all debts 
claimed by the petitioners.=' 
The court found the petition had followed the breakdown of negotiations 
for the petitioning shareholder's buy-out of the other fifty percent share- 
holder.228 The court also found the petitioning shareholder's real purpose was 
to "use the bankruptcy court a s  an  alternate approach to state court 
procedures to resolve intracompany management and stockholder problems" 
to displace the other fifty percent shareholder from the management of the 
corporation.229 The petitioning shareholder and the petitioning creditors were 
thus "comparable to the 'recalcitrant' creditor described in the legislative 
history" of the abstention provisions of the Code.230 Accordingly, the petition 
was d i s m i ~ s e d . ~ ~  
An abstention by the bankruptcy court in Quarter Moon could have 
been taken on the same grounds as in Win-Sum, and would have forced the 
parties to seek resolution of their intracorporate dispute through the dispute 
resolution tools available under state corporation doctrine.232 The state court 
is the forum most competent and legally capable to assess and ameliorate the 
special circumstances of close corporation participants. A state court would 
determine the viability of the firm, then consider a range of remedies, 
223. In re Colonial Ford, 24 B.R. at 1020; see also In re Donaldson Ford, Inc., 19 B.R. 425, 
435 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); In re Michael S. Starbuck, Inc., 14 B.R. 134, 135 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1981);. 
224. In re Win-Sum Sports, 14 B.R. 389 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981). 
225. Id. at 390. 
226. Id. at 391. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 394. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. See In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. 775,780 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990). 
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including ordering a buy-out a t  a fair price?* or issuing additional sto~k.23~ 
The shareholder deadlock, which also produces a deadlocked board, could be 
treated by appointing a provisional director236 or a custodian.236 In other 
cases, a court could resolve disputes by ordering the board to meet to declare 
a dividend,237 cancel or alter a provision in the charter or by-laws, or enjoin 
certain acts by directors, officers, or shareholders.238 
233. See CAL CORP. CODE $ 2000 (Wed 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. 4 302A.751(2) (West 
Supp. 1993); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP. $ 
42 (1989): 
The New York Business Corporation Law, $1118 provides: 
(a) In any proceeding brought pursuant to [$ 1104-a] of this chapter, any 
other shareholder or shareholders or the corporation may, a t  any time within 
ninety days after the filing of such petition or a t  such later time as the court in its 
discretion may allow, elect to purchase the shares owned by the petitioners a t  
their fair value and upon such terms and conditions as may be approved by the 
court. 
N.Y. BUS. COK. $1118 (McKinney 1986). 
In one case, a minority shareholder of a close corporation brought an action to compel 
judicial dissolution of the corporation on p u n d s  of oppression and wrongdoing. In re Pace 
Photographers Ltd., 525 N.E.2d 713,715 (N.Y. 1988). In reaction to the petition, the corporation 
elected to buy the shareholder's shares. Id. a t  715. The court held that the value would be 
determined on the basis of what a willing purchaser in an arm's length transaction would offer 
for the corporation as an operating business, rather than as  a business in the process of 
liquidation. Id. a t  718. The court held further that a sale occasioned by an 1104-a petition 
premised on abuse by the mqjority does not fall within the contemplation of the shareholder's 
agreement providing for the buy-out of shares, the price to be set according to a certain formula. 
Id. 
234. See, e.g., Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, 507 P.2d 387,393 (Or. 1973). 
235. See CAL CORP. CODE 5 1802 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 352(b) (1991); 
N.J. REV. STAT. 4 14A:12-7(1) (1991); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, MODEL 
STATUTORY CLOSE COW. SUPP. $ 41(aX7) (1989). 
236. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, $ 226 (1991); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT 
ANN. $ 14.32 (1992). 
237. See Smith v. Atlantic Props., 422 N.E.2d 798, 804 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981); Baker v. 
Commercial Body Builders, 507 P.2d 387, 395 (Or. 1973); see also REVISED MODEL BUSINESS 
CORP. ACT, MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP. $ 41(aX8) (1989). 
238. See, e.g., CAL CORP. CODE $ 1804 (West 1990); S.C. CODEANN. 4 21-155 (Law. Co-op 
1990); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP. $ 
41(aX1), (2) (1989); see also Smith v. Atlantic Props., 422 N.E.2d a t  804; Baker v. Commercial 
Body Builders, 507 P.2d a t  395-96; Hockenberger v. Curry, 215 N.W.2d 627, 628 (Neb. 1974); 
Patton v. Nicholas, 279 S.W.2d 848, 857 (Tex. 1955). See genemlly Robert W. Hillman, The 
Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative 
Pemnence  of Partnerships and Close Corpomtwns, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1982); Joseph Edward 
Olson, A Statutory Elixir for the Oppression Malady, 36 MERCER L. REV. 627 (1985); Annotation, 
Relief Other Than by Dissolution in Cases of Zntmcorpomte Deadlock or Dissension, 34 A.L.R.4th 
13 (1984); Annotation, Dissolution of Corpomtion on Ground of Intracorporate Deadlock or 
Dissenswn, 83 kL.R.3d 458 (1978). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The "reasonable expectations" analysis provides grounds for judicial 
relief to an affected minority shareholder in a close corporation, even when 
there is no showing of wrongdoing by those in control. The analysis reveals 
empathy for minority shareholders in the close corporation and a greater 
awareness of the economic rights of investors who fail to detail their rights 
and investment expectations in the written documents of their business 
enterprise. But this expanded concept of shareholder rights and interests 
and the array of dispute resolution tools available under statute and common 
law are designed not simply to protect the close corporation participant on 
notions of justice, but also to preserve business enterprises and avoid the 
social costs attendant a noneconomic based dissolution. These two objectives 
must guide bankruptcy courts. 
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